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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three essays that examine various problems in credit derivatives. In 
the first essay, we propose a novel method to extract asset correlations from credit derivatives. 
Default correlation is a concern especially after witnessing the financial crisis. To find default 
correlations, we would like to know asset correlations which are unobservable. We derive a 
model to infer asset correlations from Credit Default Swaps (CDS). We use a structural model 
approach with the first passage time as default. The resulting model is closed-form and 
extremely easy to compute. Using the data from 2004 to 2008, we find the average implied asset 
correlation from CDS to be over 0.4. The average equity correlation, which is usually used as a 
proxy for asset correlation, over the same period is 0.155. The result complies with the literature 
that there is another unobservable factor driving defaults among firms. 
The second essay examines the illiquidity of the CDS market. Researchers claim that 
CDS spreads reflect "purer" default risk than the bond spreads. We investigate whether the CDS 
market is really liquid. Since it is hard to define and measure liquidity precisely, we use an event 
study to answer the question. The event is when a CDS is included into the CDX index. This 
event changes the liquidity of CDS because they will be traded in the more liquid CDX market. 
If the CDS market is already liquid, we should observe no change in the level or correlation of 
CDS spreads. However, the spread levels do change, and the correlations between CDS and 
CDX index also change, to a lesser extent. The significant changes in the spread levels suggest 
that the CDS market is not perfectly liquid. The most likely channel for illiquidity is that order 
imbalance causes price impact depending on the direction of dealers' inventory. 
The third essay shows that stochastic recovery rates are priced ex ante in CDS and thus 
we can extract this information from CDS spreads. Recovery rates have been treated as a 
constant in the literature. However, recent empirical findings suggest that realized recovery rates 
are also stochastic and highly dependent on the industry condition. It is particularly hard to 
separate the effect of risk-neutral probability of default and risk-neutral recovery rates in CDS. 
We use the unique characteristic of ex post (physical) recovery rates to capture the ex ante (risk-
neutral) recovery rates in CDS spreads. We find that the stochastic recovery rates affect the CDS 
spreads, ex ante. If the industry is in distress, the risk-neutral recovery rates are expected to be 
lower. We derive a simple first-passage-time structural model to capture the empirical findings. 
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If the industry is in distress, the expected risk-neutral recovery rate will be lower by 20%. The 
model can be used to learn about expected recovery rates across business cycles from CDS data. 
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Chapter 1
Inferring Asset Correlations
from CDS Spreads
1.1 Introduction
Credit risk arises from the possibilities that the underlying assets in trans-
actions may default. Credit risk has a major impact on the valuation of
financial products such as the Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and
portfolio credit risk. A mistake in assessing credit risk may result in signifi-
cant losses as can be seen from the recent financial crisis. To quantify credit
risk, we want to know the probability of default of each firm and joint prob-
ability of default among firms. Unfortunately, defaults are rare, thus making
it hard to build a model to assess default probabilities. Even harder to study
are default correlations. This is because asset correlations, a crucial input
for the model, are unobservable. Some industry practitioners have tried to
use equity correlations to predict default correlations but found the result
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unsatisfactory.
There are two main approaches to model credit risk: structural models
and reduced-form models. A structural model characterizes defaults as asset
values falling below default barriers. A reduced-form model abstracts away
from the fundamentals of the firm and characterizes defaults as a Poisson
process. The advantage of a structural model is that it incorporates the dy-
namics of asset values and default barriers, thus providing an economically-
meaningful dynamic model. Unfortunately, asset values and default barriers
are unobservable. Moreover, using the first passage time as default (Black
and Cox, 1976), the model quickly becomes mathematically and computa-
tionally hard to solve.
Despite the mathematical difficulties, the intuitive and dynamical aspects
of the structural model make it appealing to model default correlations. First,
though, we have to overcome the problem that asset values and default bar-
riers are unobservable. Fortunately, with the more recent market of Credit
Default Swaps (CDSs), we have a new dataset that should reflect asset val-
ues and default barriers. Essentially, a CDS is an insurance against default
risk, and thus CDS spreads should reflect the probability of default of the
underlying asset. Moreover, the time series of CDS spreads should reflect the
dynamics of asset values, from which we can find asset correlations. The link
between CDS spreads and firm’s fundamentals has to be there, somewhere.
In this paper we establish that link. We develop a theoretical model to
infer asset correlations from CDS spreads. We derive a closed-form solution
for the probability of default and asset correlations in terms of CDS spreads.
The model is computationally efficient, requiring only a numerical integra-
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tion and differentiation. The resulting asset correlations are strikingly higher
than the corresponding equity correlations over the same period. This result
is in fact consistent with the literature which found that there is an extra un-
observable factor, apart from the well-known financial variables, that drives
defaults among firms (see, e.g., Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001)
and Das et al. (2007)).
Merton (1974) pioneers a structural model which relates the unobservable
firm value to the equity value. Black and Cox (1976) extend the model to
characterize defaults as the first passage time of the firm value across a
barrier. The first passage time distribution of a Brownian motion across a
barrier can be found in the books by Harrison (1985) or Shreve (2004). Zhou
(2001) derives the probability of default when the barrier grows at the same
rate as the expected growth rate of the firm. However, he assumes that asset
correlations and distance-to-default – a crucial input for the model, generally
unobservable – are known. This paper fills the gap by deriving a model to
find asset correlations and distance-to-default from CDS data.
Hull, Predescu and White (2009) also use a structural model approach
with first passage time to extract the mean asset correlation from CDO data.
However, they do not derive the solution in an explicit form and solve the
model instead by a Monte-Carlo simulation. Also, their approach cannot find
pairwise asset correlations, only the mean. Our model finds the probability
of default in an explicit form. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, our
model is the first to derive the dynamics of CDS spreads in terms of the
underlying asset’s Brownian motion in closed-form. As such, we can readily
find asset correlations directly from CDS spreads without the need of Monte-
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Carlo simulation. We can find pairwise asset correlations given CDS data of
any two firms. Giesecke (2004) provides a model for correlated default with
incomplete information, also based on a structural model. The key to default
correlation in his case is that investors suddenly learn about the barriers of
other firms associated to the defaulted firm. Our paper is concerned with ex-
tracting the asset correlation parameter from credit derivatives instruments.
There is no surprise in the firm’s value or barrier in our model.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, we extend a structural
model to address the relationship between CDS spreads and the probability
of default and asset dynamics. To make the model as simple as possible, we
need a ”nice” assumption, which is, the barrier growing at an exponentially
deterministic rate equal to the asset’s expected growth rate. In Section 1.3,
we use the theoretical result to extract the probability of default and asset
correlations from CDS data from the period of 2004 to 2008, and compare
them to equity correlations. In Section 1.4, we relax the ”nice” assumption
and incorporate more realistic assumptions from recent literature. We show
that the results still remain the same. In Section 1.5 , we simulate an artificial
economy using the first passage time framework to find the true implied
correlations. In Section 2.6, we interpret the difference between implied
correlations from credit and equity markets. Finally we end with conclusion
and future work.
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1.2 Model
A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a contract that provides insurance against
the risk of a default by a particular company. The company is known as the
reference entity and a default by the company is known as a credit event. The
buyer of this contract obtains the right to sell bonds issued by the reference
entity for their face value when a credit event occurs. On the other hand, the
CDS seller agrees to buy the bonds for their face value when a credit event
occurs, thus bearing the risk of default.
The CDS buyer makes periodic payments to the seller until the end of the
life of the CDS or until a credit event occurs. The settlement, in the event of
a default, involves either physical delivery of the bonds or a cash payment.
The observable quantity in the market is the payment by the CDS buyer,
also known as CDS spreads. The CDS spread in a liquid market reflects the
fair price of default insurance, i.e., the spread must make the expected value
of the buyer’s periodic payments equal to the expected value of the seller’s
losses in case of a default .
We take CDS spread formula, given for the contract starting from time 0
to T , from Hull, Predescu and White (2009):
S =
(1− Rˆ)(1 + a∗) ∫ T
0
q(u)v(u)du∫ T
0
q(u)[h(u) + e(u)]du+ (1− ∫ T
0
q(u)du)h(T )
(1.1)
where
T : The period of the contract
q(u) : Probability density function (pdf) of default at time u in a risk-neutral
world
Rˆ : Expected recovery rate on the reference obligation in a risk-neutral world
5
h(u) : Present value of payments at the rate $1 per year on payment dates
between time zero and time u
e(u) : Present value of accrual payment at time u equal to u− u∗ where u∗
is the payment date immediately preceding time u
v(u) : Present value of $1 received at time u
a∗ : Average value of accrued interest rate on the reference obligation for the
period 0 to T
The important quantity in this equation is q(u). In a structural model we
characterize default as the first passage time of the firm value (V ) across the
barrier (B). We assume the barrier grows at the same rate as the expected
growth rate of the firm, i.e., the firm has a constant expected leverage ratio
in the risk-neutral measure. We choose this assumption mainly to find the
simplest possible model to express CDS spread dynamics in terms of asset
dynamics. This assumption turns out to simplify much of the mathemat-
ics involved. Economically, this assumption is supported by recent papers.
Almeida and Philippon (2007) argue that firms evaluate capital structure
decisions in the risk-neutral measure. Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001)
find that a structural model with mean-reverting leverage ratios is more con-
sistent with empirical findings. Considering the two papers together, we
assume in the model that firms maintain a constant expected leverage ratio
in the risk-neutral measure. Later on we will relax this assumption and im-
plement the more realistic mean-reverting model as in Collin-Dufresne and
Goldstein (2001) and confirm that the results do not change.
The probability of default is equal to the first passage time distribution.
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The analytical formula is well-known as given by Harrison (1985) and Shreve
(2004) and is also used by Zhou (2001). We summarize the basic setup and
the result here while the proof can be found in Appendix A.1.
In the risk-neutral measure, we have
dV
V
= rdu+ σdWQ
Let B(u) be the default barrier at time u. By our assumption,
B(u) = B(0)e(r−
σ2
2
)u
With this setup, we get the default density (or first passage time density) in
the risk-neutral measure:
q(m,u) =
m
u
√
2piu
e
−m2
2u
where m =
log(
V (0)
B(0)
)
σ
. Note that m is equivalent to the distance-to-default at
the beginning of CDS contract. The density q(m,u) here is indeed what we
want for q(u) in equation 3.2.
Figure 1.1 shows the probability density of default, q(m,u), for selected
values of m corresponding to different credit ratings. Figure 1.2 shows the
historical default density from S&P report for firms with different credit
ratings. Note that the two figures show similar patterns of defaults. We
conclude that the theoretical formula of default density, q(m,u), can cap-
ture real-world default probabilities, and thus can be used to calculate CDS
spreads.
Now we consider the CDS spread at any contract time t to t + T . We
write (3.2) as follows:
S(m, t) =
(1− Rˆ)(1 + a∗) ∫ t+T
t
q(m,u− t)v(u− t)du∫ t+T
t
q(m,u− t)[h(u− t) + e(u− t)]du+ (1− ∫ t+T
t
q(m,u− t)du)h(t+ T )
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where m =
log(
V (t)
B(t)
)
σ
, the distance-to-default at the beginning of the contract
at time t. In fact the integration limits of this expression do not depend on
t. Indeed, let w = u− t, we get
S(m) =
e−rt
[
(1− Rˆ)(1 + a∗) ∫ T
0
q(m,w)v(w)dw
]
e−rt
[∫ T
0
q(m,w)[h(w) + e(w)]dw + (1− ∫ T
0
q(m,w)dw)h(T )
]
=
(1− Rˆ)(1 + a∗) ∫ T
0
q(m,w)v(w)dw∫ T
0
q(m,w)[h(w) + e(w)]dw + (1− ∫ T
0
q(m,w)dw)h(T )
(1.2)
In other words, CDS spreads depend only on the distance-to-default at
the beginning of the contract. CDS spreads as a function of distance-to-
default (m) is shown in Figure 1.3. We numerically solve (1.2) using T = 5,
risk-free rate (r) = 0.025, recovery rate (Rˆ) = 0.4 and a∗ = 0.004.
The figure is self-explanatory and intuitive. Lower distance-to-default
corresponds to higher probability of default and higher CDS spreads, and
vice-versa. From this graph, we can infer the distance-to-default (m) from
observable CDS spreads and calculate the risk-neutral probability of default
before time u using the formula (proof in Appendix A.1):
P {τm ≤ u} = 2Φ(−m√
u
)
where τm is the time of default depending on m. Now we want to find the
dynamics of CDS spreads as a function of the underlying asset’s dynamics.
We write the dynamics of S(m) using Ito’s lemma:
dS =
∂S
∂m
dm+
1
2
(
∂2S
∂m2
)(dm)2 (1.3)
Now consider m(V,B). Using Ito’s lemma, we obtain:
dm =
∂m
∂V
dV +
1
2
(
∂2m
∂V 2
)(dV )2 +
∂m
∂B
dB
= dWQ (1.4)
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Proof: See Appendix A.2
Note that the dynamic dm is just a standard Brownian motion. In-
tuitively, m represents the distance-to-default normalized by volatility (σ).
With the assumption that the barrier (B) grows at the same rate as the value
of firm (V ), the dynamic of distance to default is just the same random walk
represented by the stochastic term of dV . In other words, with a constant
expected leverage ratio, the distance-to-default is just a martingale.
Then consider dS from (1.3). Plug in dm = dWQ, we get:
dS =
1
2
(
∂2S
∂m2
)dt+
∂S
∂m
dWQ (1.5)
which means the dynamic of the CDS spread is governed solely by ∂
2S
∂m2
and
∂S
∂m
. The values of ∂S
∂m
and ∂
2S
∂m2
can be found either by a numerical integration
and differentiation of (1.2) or by analytical means (in Appendix A.3). We
have seen that S(m) is a one-to-one function of m. Moreover, ∂S
∂m
and ∂
2S
∂m2
are
one-to-one functions of m. Thus, we can find one-to-one functions h(S) = ∂S
∂m
and l(S) = ∂
2S
∂m2
, which depend only on CDS spreads themselves. We can
write (1.5) as
dS =
1
2
l(S)dt+ h(S)dWQ (1.6)
To infer the correlation between any two assets we first write:
dSi − 12 l(Si)dt
h(Si)
= dWQi
where the subscript i denotes distinct asset index. The correlation between
any two assets is given by:
ρ = corr(dWi, dWj) = corr(dW
Q
i , dW
Q
j ) = corr(
dSi − 12 l(Si)dt
h(Si)
,
dSj − 12 l(Sj)dt
h(Sj)
)
(1.7)
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Note here that correlations in the physical measure are equal to corre-
lations in the risk-neutral measure in this simple setup. From numerical
integration and differentiation and polynomial fitting, we approximate l(S)
and h(S) as follows:
l(S) = 42.6778S5 − 18.8941S4 + 73.9661S3 + 1.8244S2 + 0.5223S + 0.0013
h(S) = −4.3931S5 + 9.6218S4 − 7.7494S3 − 2.9201S2 − 0.6497S − 0.0014
1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Data
We use CDS data1 from Credit Market Analysis (CMA), acquired by CME
on March 25, 2008. The data are daily ranging from January 2004 to May
2008. For this paper we use only 5-year CDS data because they are the most
common and most liquid. For convenience we use only the CDS data with
complete time series over the specified period. Since we want to compare
asset correlations inferred from CDS spreads with equity correlations, we
then consider only CDS data with matching stock returns data from CRSP.
We end up with 193 firms over the period of about 4.5 years. The summary
statistics of the CDS data and matching stock returns are presented in Table
3.9 and Table 3.2.
1We thank Tom Jacobs for collecting and preprocessing the data
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1.3.2 Empirical Results
From the theoretical result ρ = corr(dWi, dWj) = corr(
dSi− 12 l(Si)dt
h(Si)
,
dSj− 12 l(Sj)dt
h(Sj)
),
we discretize as follows:
ρ = corr(
Si,t+1 − Si,t − 12 l(Si)∆t
h(Si,t)
,
Sj,t+1 − Sj,t − 12 l(Si)∆t
h(Sj,t)
)
We use monthly intervals for discretization (and thus ∆t = 1/12) to avoid
autocorrelation in CDS data. From the model we can infer pairwise asset
correlations of 193 firms. We report a histogram of lower triangular entries of
the correlation matrix. We then compare this result with the corresponding
equity correlations from the same set of firms over the same period. The
result is shown in Figure 1.4. Pairwise differences in correlations are shown
in Figure 1.5.
There is a big difference between equity correlations and asset correlations
as shown in Figure 1.4 and 1.5. The magnitude of the mean difference is 0.260
which is very large for correlations. If the true correlations are those implied
by CDS spreads, one can be off by a large amount if one uses equity corre-
lations in place of asset correlations to calculate default correlations. One
question arises: which correlation is correct? We will address this question
in the Default Simulation section.
1.4 Robustness Check
The result from the previous section depends on the correctness of the model,
which, in turn, depends on the assumptions about the underlying processes
of firms and debt barriers. In this section we incorporate more realistic
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assumptions from recent literature about these processes. We show that the
main results still hold.
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) shows that the model for stationary
leverage ratios fits the credit spread data better. Firms adjust outstanding
debt levels in response to firm value, thus generating mean-reverting leverage
ratios. The key difference between their model and our model is that there
is no target leverage ratio in our model. In fact, for our model, if the asset
volatility is constant, the log-leverage is simply a Brownian motion of the firm
scaled by the standard deviation of the underlying asset. The model yields
a very simple close form solution yet it can be viewed as too simplistic. In
this section we start with the stationary (mean-reverting) leverage model as
in Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) and derive the formula for implied
correlation. Then we calibrate the model to the data and find the empirical
results to compare with the previous section.
Similar to Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), we let the log-leverage
lt follow the mean-reverting process in the risk-neutral measure:
dlt = λ(l¯
Q − lt)dt+ σdWQt (1.8)
where λ = 0.18, l¯Q = -0.6556 for investment-grade firms and -0.5556 for
high-yield firms, and σ = 0.2.
The distance-to-default m is defined as
log V
B
σ
= −l
σ
. Thus, the dynamic of
m is:
dmt = λ(m¯
Q −mt)dt+ dWQt (1.9)
Now default is defined as the first time Vt = Bt or the first time mt = 0.
There is a closed-form solution to the first passage time density of a mean-
reverting process (see Appendix A.4). Similar to the previous section, this
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density is the default density and thus we can find CDS spreads as a function
of the starting distance-to-default (m0). We show the plot in Figure 1.6.
We can see that, for the same distance-to-default (m), the CDS spread
from the stationary leverage model is lower than the original model without
mean reversion. The result is intuitive because with mean-reversion, the
high-leveraged firms will decrease the leverage going forward, thus reducing
the probability of default. The model is calibrated to the parameters for
investment-grade firms, which account the majority of CDS data.
The dynamic of CDS spreads is similar to the previous section, but with
a slight change in the drift term. In particular,
dS =
∂S
∂m
dm+
1
2
∂2S
∂m2
(dm)2
=
∂S
∂m
[
λ(m¯Q −mt)dt+ dWQt
]
+
1
2
∂2S
∂m2
dt
=
[
1
2
∂2S
∂m2
+
∂S
∂m
λ(m¯Q −mt)
]
dt+
∂S
∂m
dWQt (1.10)
The dynamic of CDS spreads in (1.10) is similar to (1.5) except for the drift
term. We calibrate the model to the data similar to the previous section but
using the mean-reverting CDS spread curve instead. We find l(S) = 1
2
∂2S
∂m2
and h(S) = ∂S
∂m
as a function of S itself and get the following curve:
l(S) = −13273.51S5 + 5573.63S4 − 551.23S3 + 53.7093S2 − 0.0277S + 0.0019
h(S) = 391.2648S5 − 199.1543S4 + 33.1832S3 − 11.8712S2 − 0.5717S − 0.0011
With the dynamics of CDS spreads, the implied correlation can be cal-
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culated similarly as before:
ρ = corr(dWQi , dW
Q
j )
= corr
(
dSi − 12 l(Si)dt− h(Si)(λ(m¯Qi −mi))
h(Si)
,
dSj − 12 l(Sj)dt− h(Sj)(λ(m¯Qj −mj))
h(Sj)
)
With the closed-form solution, we can calculate the implied correlation from
CDS spreads as before. The value of m¯Q is the target distance-to-default
of investment-grade firms. We can find m from the CDS spreads just by
inverting the graph in Figure 1.6.
We calibrate the stationary leverage model to the same dataset. The
result is similar to the original model without mean reversion. The average
implied asset correlation from CDS spreads is 0.4249, in line with the re-
sult from our model without mean reversion. We also calibrate the model
to the parameters for high-yield firms and the average implied asset corre-
lation is 0.43. Thus, our main result still holds even when we adopt a more
sophisticated model with stationary leverage ratios.
1.5 Default Simulation
It is hard to determine which correlation, implied correlation from CDS or
equity correlation, is the correct value, since we do not know the true asset
correlation in the first place. One way to determine is to check whether
asset correlations from CDS spreads predict default correlations. However,
it will come down to the same problem that defaults are rare and thus we will
not have reliable statistical results. Another way is to match the standard
deviation of yearly default rates with the true correlations. This approach
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comes from the fact that correlations determine the standard deviation of
default rates, but not the average. We use this approach in this section.
We take the descriptive statistics of default rates from Moody’s 2011
report which has the historical data of default rates from 1920 - 2010. We
focus only on B and Caa-C firms because the mean and standard deviation
of default rates are large enough to simulate and compare meaningfully with
the statistics of historical data. In particular, we want to match the historical
statistics in Table 1.3.
We proceed as follows:
1. Find the distance-to-default (m) that matches the average default for
B and Caa-C firms for the next year (= 2N(−m))
2. Simulate 100 firms of the same category with the same pairwise asset
correlations (ρ).
• The underlying process of the firm follows a Brownian motion
• Default occurs when the Brownian motion hits the barrier m
• Use 200 intervals in 1 year and 10,000 trials
3. Find ρ that matches the standard deviation of default rates
The result is shown in Table 1.4. For B firms the implied correlation
from simulation is 0.25, while for C firms it is 0.45. The result does not
point to one absolute number for the true correlation. However, the implied
correlation from the simulation is high, more in line with our result from
CDS spreads rather than the correlation from equity returns.
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1.6 Interpretation
What can explain the difference in implied asset correlations from CDS
spreads and correlations from equity returns? If the equity market and the
credit market are integrated and the model is correct, then the implied cor-
relation from both markets should be the same.
One explanation can be that the bond market, or credit risk in particu-
lar, is driven by another factor apart from the systematic factors that drive
equity returns. Many papers also found the same phenomena. For example,
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) found that there is a single
common factor, apart from several standard economic and financial vari-
ables, that drives credit spreads. Das et al. (2007) also found that there are
unobservable explanatory variables for corporate defaults that are correlated
across firms. If this unobservable factor drives corporate defaults and credit
spreads, then it will also drive CDS spreads. This factor can be the reason
why the implied correlation from CDS spreads is higher than the correla-
tion from equity returns. In other words, the implied correlation from CDS
spreads is the result of two driving forces: the systematic factor that drives
equity returns, and the unobservable factor that has been found to drive
corporate defaults and credit spreads.
This explanation supports our view that the implied correlation from CDS
spreads should be a better proxy for default correlations than the correlation
from equity returns. Our intuition is that the credit market is closer to default
and thus it will provide a more accurate estimation of default correlations.
Moreover, defaults are driven by a separate unobservable factor apart from
the systematic factor in the equity market. We can only detect this factor in
16
the credit market but not the equity market.
Another explanation is that correlation is not constant and CDS spreads
reflect the correlation in the distress period. During the year 2008-2009
(during the financial crisis), the mean equity correlation is 0.412, much higher
than the mean equity correlation in the previous period of 0.155. This average
equity correlation is in fact closer to the mean implied asset correlation from
CDS spreads (=0.416) during the previous period (year 2004-2008). The
market values CDS contracts as if there are high correlations among their
asset values. The expectation of high correlations happens just before the
financial crisis. It is possible that CDS spreads reflect asset correlations
during the period of market stress, which is when defaults are most likely to
occur. This explanation also supports our view that the implied correlation
from CDS spreads is a better proxy for default correlations.
1.7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have derived a model to infer asset correlations from CDS spreads. To the
best of our knowledge, our model is the first closed-form solution that links
CDS spread dynamics to asset dynamics and, correspondingly, asset corre-
lations. The asset correlations inferred from CDS spreads are much higher
than the corresponding equity correlations. The result is robust even when
we use the more complicated mean-reverting leverage ratio model. Once
we know asset correlations and distance-to-default, we can calculate default
correlations.
We proceed to determine which correlation, implied correlation from CDS
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spreads or the correlation from equity returns, is correct. Default simula-
tion of historical data suggests that the actual correlation should be higher
than the equity correlation, and more in line with our correlation from CDS
spreads. The results also comply with the literature in that there is an un-
observable factor, apart from the systematic factor in equity returns, that
drives defaults and credit spreads among firms. It is also possible that CDS
spreads reflect asset correlations during the period of market stress when
defaults occur; correlations themselves can change over time, with high val-
ues during the recession period. All the evidence confirms our intuition that
the implied correlation from CDS, the product closest to default, is a better
proxy for default correlations than the correlation from equity returns.
To relate asset dynamics and CDS spread dynamics, our model is ar-
guably the simplest possible. With this simple background model and a
closed-form solution, it is possible to extend the model to include more so-
phisticated products or default barrier dynamics. Future research may also
include identifying the factor that drives default correlations among firms.
1.8 Figures and Tables
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Figure 1.1: Probability density of default: q(m,t). The plot shows the theo-
retical probability of the first passage time of asset values across debt barriers
for firms with different ratings. The probability depends on the distance-to-
default (m) and time (t)
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Figure 1.2: Historical default density. S&P data from 1981 to 2008. This
is the actual historical default rates categorized by the initial credit ratings.
The plot is used to compare historical default density with the theoretical
default density in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.3: CDS spreads as a function of distance-to-default. The graph is
generated from Equation 1.2 with parameters T = 5, risk-free rate (r) =
0.025, recovery rate (Rˆ) = 0.4 and a∗ = 0.004., and with the theoretical
probability of default q(m, t).
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Figure 1.4: Histogram of implied asset correlations and equity correlations.
The figure shows the histogram of implied pairwise asset correlations from
CDS spreads using our theoretical formula (in dotted plot). The histogram
of equity correlations is also shown for comparison (in solid plot). The mean
asset correlation is 0.415 while the mean equity correlation is 0.155.
Figure 1.5: Histogram of pairwise differences in correlations (Asset - Equity).
The mean difference is 0.260.
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Figure 1.6: CDS spreads as a function of distance-to-default. The dashed
line shows the CDS spreads corresponding to the mean-reverting leverage
ratio model as in Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). The solid line shows
the CDS spreads corresponding to our model with no mean reversion
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of CDS data
The table shows the summary statistics of CDS data used in the empirical section.
CDS Spread shows the spreads in basis points. The remaining information in the table
comes from the CRSP database. Market Cap shows the market capitalization of firms in
millions. Stock Monthly Volatility shows monthly volatility of the stock. Beta(β) shows
the beta coefficient when regressing the stock returns with market returns. SMB and
HML shows the regression coefficients when regressing the stock returns with the SMB
and HML factors
CDS Spread Market Cap (M) Stock Monthly Volatilities β SMB HML
mean 79.27 27,496 0.068 0.94 0.12 0.31
median 38.60 13,524 0.062 0.85 0 0.19
min 1.5 176 0.031 -0.19 -3.05 -1.34
5% quantile 11.7 1,923 0.036 0.16 -0.87 -0.81
25% quantile 23.7 6,404 0.049 0.63 -0.33 -0.19
50% quantile 38.6 13,524 0.062 0.85 0 0.19
75% quantile 70.5 27,955 0.078 1.18 0.60 0.76
95% quantile 316.1 99,429 0.120 2.09 1.41 1.67
max 2666.5 513,362 0.229 2.77 2.44 2.79
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Table 1.2: Industry Classification
This table shows the percentage of firms in the data set classified into each industry,
according to the Siccodes on Kenneth French’s website.
Number Industry Percent
1 Consumer Nondurables 7.75
2 Consumer Durables 2.87
3 Manufacturing 17.65
4 Energy 5.41
5 Hi-tech 5.69
6 Telecom 3.10
7 Wholesale, Retail 12.48
8 Healthcare 7.20
9 Utilities 8.76
10 Other: Mines, Trans,Const, Finance, etc 29.10
Table 1.3: Historical average and standard deviation of default rates
The data are from Moody’s 2011 report. We focus only on B and Caa-C firms
because the mean and standard deviation of default rates are large enough
to simulate and compare meaningfully with the statistics of historical data.
Ratings Averate Default Rates Standard Deviation of Default Rates
B 3.41% 4.04%
Caa-C 13.86 % 17.05%
25
Table 1.4: Default simulation result
We fix the average default rate of B and Caa-C firms by finding the implied
distance-to-default using the theoretical formula. Then we find the implied
correlation from the simulation to match the standard deviation of historical
data.
Ratings Distance-to-Default (m) Implied Correlation
B 2.12 0.25
Caa-C 1.48 0.45
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Chapter 2
The Illiquidity of CDS Market
2.1 Introduction
Credit derivatives market is relatively new. The market existed since early
1990s but grew exponentially from 2003 until the financial meltdown in 2008.
Within credit derivatives, the most liquid and most traded instrument is
Credit Default Swap (CDS) with 5-year maturity. Since this financial instru-
ment is insurance on credit risk of the underlying bonds, finance academics
and practitioners can extract default probabilities from its price. The credit
derivatives price may even be a better indicator of default risk than the bond
price itself, because the bond market is relatively illiquid and burdened with
complicated contracts and maturity structures. The CDS market would be
ideal for credit risk researchers, only if the market is really liquid and the
spreads reflect a fair price. This paper asks this simple question: is CDS
market really liquid? The answer is unfortunately no.
To test whether the CDS market is liquid or not, we need to know first
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how to ”measure” liquidity. In the literature, it is still not clear how to mea-
sure such quantity precisely, although we know that illiquidity will somehow
affect the price. In this paper, we bypass the problem of definition and mea-
surement of liquidity. We focus on the ”event” when liquidity changes and
ask the question: do CDS spreads change? Our main hypothesis is as follows.
If the market condition becomes more liquid, but the CDS spreads do not
change, it means that the original CDS market is already liquid, or at least
as liquid as the new market. If the spreads do change, then the original CDS
market is not liquid. In this paper, we found the latter to be the case.
On the Markit website, the administrator and marketer of CDX index,
it says that one of the key benefits of CDX index is liquidity - wide dealer
and industry support allow for significant liquidity in all market conditions.
Moreover, one of the key functions of CDX index is that it enhances liquidity
in the single name market - the liquidity of the index flows into the single
name CDS market.
Thus, the ”event” that changes liquidity here is the inclusion of CDSs
into a Credit Default Swap index (CDX). The CDX index is created every 6
months and consisted of 125 CDSs. Once a CDS is included into the index,
it stays there for at least 6 months until the next roll date. The CDS can also
be excluded from the index if the committee decides so. The time t = 0 for
the event is when a CDS is included into CDX and starts trading, so called
the roll date. We found the cumulative abnormal changes of CDS spreads
to be positive and economically high. There can be many explanations for
this observation, but the reversal in the spread suggests that the most likely
channel for illiquidity is that order imbalance causes price impact depending
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on the direction of dealers’ inventory.
For robustness check, we also conjecture that if a CDS is excluded from
the index, then the liquidity will change as well and this should affect the
price. We found this to be the case in the data. Moreover, the correlation
between CDS and CDX, when the CDS is included, should be higher than
when it is not included – the higher liquidity allows the price to adjust
easily according to the information and market belief, and so the individual
price co-moves more with the aggregated credit risk. We also explore this
hypothesis and found positive evidence, but the evidence is not very strong.
We also argue that an alternative explanation that index inclusion conveys
information about the underlying credit risk is unlikely to be the case.
Recent research uses CDS spreads instead of bond yield spreads to be a
proxy for default probabilities, arguing that much of bond yield spreads is due
to illiquidity. Examples include Longstaff et al. (2005), Chen et al. (2007),
and Huang and Huang (2003). Blanco et al. (2005) suggest that CDSs
are a cleaner indicator than bond spreads, and that CDS prices are useful
indicators for analysts interested in measuring credit risk. Our paper does
not assume that the CDS market is liquid and will explore this issue. Several
papers have explored the effect of index inclusion or adjustment on prices.
Examples include Shleifer (1986) and Kaul et al. (2000). They observe excess
stock returns after index inclusion or adjustment and conclude that demand
curves for stocks slope down. Our paper differs in that we study derivatives
products, whose net supply is zero.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the CDX index
and the inclusion and exclusion procedure. Section 2.3 describes the data for
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CDS and CDX. Section 2.4 is an empirical analysis and event study. Section
2.5 is a robustness check. Section 2.6 describes the possible reasons we see an
increase in CDS spreads after index inclusion. The final section concludes.
2.2 CDX Index and Inclusion and Exclusion
Procedure
A Credit Default Swap index (CDX) is a credit derivative used to hedge
credit risk on a basket of CDSs. The index is a standardized credit security
and is more liquid and traded at a smaller bid-ask spread. There are two
main families of CDS indices: CDX and iTraxx. In this paper, we only
concentrate on the CDX index, especially CDX.NA.IG which contains CDSs
of North American Investment Grade bonds. The index is administered by
CDS Index Company and marketed by Markit Group Limited.
A new CDX index is issued every six months by Markit. The composition
of the Investment Grade (IG) Index is determined based on submissions by
each member that elects to participate in the determination of the IG Index
and each related sub-index on a continuing basis. Each IG Index is composed
of one hundred twenty five (125) entities, with equal weighting of 0.8%. Each
IG Index begins on September 20 (or the next Business Day in the event that
September 20 is not a Business Day) and March 20(or the next Business Day
in the event that March 20 is not a Business Day) of each calendar year.
Since the number of CDSs in a CDX is fixed at 125, some CDSs must be
excluded before a new CDS can be included into the index. We explain below
the exclusion process before the inclusion process. The information is taken
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from Markit’s publication, ”Index Methodology for the CDX Indices, (2007)”
The polling process to decide which CDS to exclude is as follows. Ten (10)
business days prior to the Roll Date of a new IG Index, the Administrator
will solicit each eligible IG Member to submit a list of entities in the then
current IG Index that in such Eligible IG Members judgment should not be
included in the IG Index for the next six-month period based on the following
criteria
1. entities for which the associated reference obligation is rated below
investment grade by two of S&P, Moodys and Fitch;
2. entities for which a merger or other corporate action has occurred or
been announced that renders such entity no longer suitable for inclu-
sion;
3. entities whose outstanding debt or for which credit default swap con-
tracts has/have become materially less liquid.
The polling process to decide which CDS to be included into the index
is as follows. After CDSs have been eliminated from the index and no later
than nine (9) business days prior to the Roll Date, the Administrator will
determine the number of additional entities required to add to those entities
remaining in the new IG Index to total one hundred twenty five (125) and
will solicit each eligible IG Member to submit a list of entities. No later
than seven (7) business days prior to the Roll Date (the Index Publication
Date), the Administrator will publish to the public and eligible IG Members
the composition of the new IG Index for that next six-month period. At
such time, the Administrator will also publish to the public the current list
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of eligible IG Members for the new IG Index. Two (2) business days prior
to the Roll Date, the Administrator will publish to the eligible IG Members
(but not the public) a draft of the annex for the IG Index and each sub-index
along with the weighting and final reference obligations for each entity within
the new IG Index and each new sub-index. The final annex for the IG Index
and each sub-index will be published after 5:00 p.m. on the Business Day
immediately preceding the Roll Date. Products based on the new IG Index
will begin trading on the Roll Date.
Thus, from the Markit publication, CDSs will be decided to be excluded
from the index 10 days before the new roll date. The CDSs that will be
included into the index will be published to the public no later than 7 days
before the new roll date. These dates are important when we do the event
study.
A new development has been made to the index procedure. According to
the Markit’s ”CDX and LCDX Rules 2012”, the determinant of inclusion and
exclusion is the liquidity of the individual names, as published on the DTCC
Trade Information Warehouse (market risk activity for the Top 1000 names).
In particular, the most liquid names will be included into the index and the
most illiquid will be dropped. However, this guideline on liquidity did not
exist in the prior CDX and LCDX rules in 2007 when our data concern.
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 CDS Data
We use CDS data from Credit Market Analysis (CMA), acquired by CME
on March 25, 2008. The data are daily ranging from January 2004 to May
2008. We use only 5-year CDS data because they are the most common and
most liquid. One potential flaw of using daily data is that CDS spreads can
have high autocorrelations. To get a clean result, we use monthly data in the
regression analysis. However, for the event study section, we need daily data
to draw conclusion, while monthly data are too crude to yield any meaningful
result.
There are 24 firms that are included into the index during our study
period. The summary statistics of the CDSs of these firms are shown in
Table 3.9. The mean and median of the CDS spreads are within a reasonable
range. However, the standard deviation of the spreads is high compared to
the average. This can be due to the fact that our data end just before the
credit crisis. As the economy approached the crisis, the CDS spreads became
highly volatile.
It may be of interest to see how our sample CDSs are classified into
different industries, although we do not have any link between CDS spreads
and the industry in this paper. The industry classification is shown in Table
3.2.
The data are biased towards the wholesale/retail industry. Many firms
are also classified as ”Other” (Industry 10), which do not have shared char-
acteristics. We wish to have a more balanced dataset with equally weighted
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firms in each industry. On the other hand, in this paper we are not concerned
with any link between industry characteristics and CDS spreads. The data
should be fine for our purposes.
2.3.2 Inclusion Dates
In our study period, there are 8 inclusion dates as follows:
1. Inclusion Date 1 = 23Mar2004
2. Inclusion Date 2 = 21Sep2004
3. Inclusion Date 3 = 21Sep2005
4. Inclusion Date 4 = 21Mar2006
5. Inclusion Date 5 = 21Sep2006
6. Inclusion Date 6 = 21Mar2007
7. Inclusion Date 7 = 21Sep2007
8. Inclusion Date 8 = 21Mar2008
The period spans from the beginning of 2004 to the middle of 2008, which is
the period of our CDS data. Most inclusion dates are 6-month apart, except
for Inclusion Date 2(ID2) and Inclusion Date 3(ID3). Between ID2 and ID3,
there is no CDS in our sample that is included in March of 2005. Note also
that ID6, ID7, ID8 fall in the period when the economy was approaching
the financial crisis. This explains the high volatility of CDS spreads in our
sample.
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2.4 Regression Analysis and Event Study
2.4.1 Regression Analysis
The first test to run is to test whether there is an average change in the
spreads at all when the CDS is included into the index. A simple test is to
use a dummy variable 1[Included], which is equal to 1 when a CDS is included
into the index and 0 otherwise. We first report this simple regression result
in Table 3.4.
This regression is still preliminary. It does not include any other factors
that may affect CDS spreads. The R2 is very low. Yet we see that the
inclusion dummy is statistically significant and economically large. From
this regression, if a CDS is included into the CDX index, the average spreads
go up by 60 basis points. The coefficient is rather too high and calls for more
control variables.
A number of other factors determine CDS spreads and should be included
in the regression. We follow closely the paper by Cossin and Hricko (2001).
They identify the following determinants of CDS spreads:
1. Credit Ratings: These are the most widely used measure of credit
risk. We use S&P ratings available from the Compustat database. The
credit ratings range from AAA to C. We assign a linear scale for each
rating, i.e., AAA = 1, AA+ = 2, ..., C = 17. It may seem doubtful
that ratings will affect CDS spreads in this linear fashion. However,
we simply follow the same methodology as Cossin and Hricko (2001)
and this method is also prevalent in the literature. Moreover, it is not
clear whether (or which) a more sophisticated function of ratings would
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produce a better fit. Furthermore, credit ratings are quite sticky, i.e.,
they do not change very often. Thus, in our regression which focuses
on the event that the CDS is included into an index, credit ratings do
not appear to have a lot of effect on the coefficient of interest.
2. Interest Rates: This factor affects the discount factor and the proba-
bility of default in the risk-neutral measure. We use both short-term
(3-month) and long-term (5-year) treasury bills rates in the analysis.
3. Leverage: This factor indicates how close the firm’s value is to the
debt value. This factor is directly related to the probability of default.
Another important factor is the asset volatility which is unobservable.
If we assume that the asset volatility is constant for each firm, then the
volatility effect can be controlled by the firm’s fixed effect. Thus, we will
use only leverage for each firm, and then use firm’s fixed effect to control
for other factors including asset volatility. Leverage is calculated by the
ratio of Total Debt to Market Asset, where
Total Debt = Long Term Debt (DLTTQ) +
Debt in Current Liabilities (DLCQ)
Market Asset = Asset (ATQ) + Market Equity (CSHOQ*PRCCQ)
−Shareholder’s Equity (SEQQ)
The variables in parentheses indicate the corresponding variable names
from the Compustat database. This calculation of leverage is standard.
4. Index Returns: This factor indicates the state of the economy, which
should affect the wellness of the business, and thus the probability of
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default. We use S&P500 index monthly returns available from the
CRSP database.
There are 5 columns in Table 2.4, with different regression covariates.
After controlling for other factors, the inclusion dummy variable is still sta-
tistically significant. Moreover, the economic magnitude is high. If we look
at the first 3 columns, where the dependent variable is the CDS spreads, the
coefficient for the inclusion dummy is about 30 basis points. This means
that if a CDS is included into an index, then the spread increases on average
by 30 basis points. This magnitude is high, although it is less than 60 basis
points in the first regression. Now we discuss each column in Table 2.4 in
detail.
The first column is a linear regression between CDS spreads and all control
variables, all in linear scale. We use firm’s fixed effect in the regression. All
factors are highly significant, and the sign is in the direction that we expect.
The inclusion dummy is significant.
The second column is similar to the first column, but we change the scale
of leverage to a log scale. In this paper we do not assume a particular form
of asset model, and thus we show that any specific functional form does
not matter to our main result. In this case, if we let CDS spreads depend
on the log of leverage instead of leverage itself, as in the second column,
the log(leverage) variable is highly significant. The inclusion dummy is still
significant. However, the R2 appears to be a little lower than the first column.
In the third column we turn back to a linear leverage model. But we
change the interest rates to be in a log scale. The result is that the log
of interest rates, both short and long term, are highly significant. The R2
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is higher than the first column with linear interest rates. The inclusion
dummy is still significant, although the magnitude is slightly less than the
first column. From the first three columns, we may conclude that linear
leverage and log interest rates fit best with the CDS data. The inclusion
effect is significant throughout.
In the fourth column we change CDS spreads to a log scale. The covari-
ates are the same as in the first column. All factors are significant in this
regression, but R2 increases significantly from the first three columns. The
inclusion dummy remains significant.
The fifth column is similar to the fourth column, but we change leverage
into a log scale. All factors are highly significant, but the R2 appears to be
slightly lower than the fourth column. The inclusion dummy is significant.
Thus, overall, the inclusion dummy variable is significant, regardless of
the functional form of the covariates. From the table, we can also conclude
that the linear covariates fit best to the log of CDS spreads.
2.4.2 Event Study
From the regression analysis, we see that inclusion does affect the CDS
spreads. In this section we test our hypothesis with another approach. The
main hypothesis is that the liquidity of CDS changes when the CDS is in-
cluded into an index, and this in turn affects the CDS spreads. Since the
liquidity changes when an event occurs, another approach is to do an event
study. We let t = 0 when a CDS is included into the CDX index. We then
look at the Cumulative Abnormal Changes (CAC) around the event when
t = 0 for each included CDS. The CAC is simply the sum of Abnormal
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Changes (AC) within the same rating up to time t. Suppose there are N
firms with the same rating as firm i. Starting form t = −k, The CAC for
firm i at time t is defined as:
ACi,t = (CDSi,t − CDSi,t−1)− 1
N − n
N∑
j=1,j not included
(CDSj,t − CDSj,t−1),
j and i have the same rating,
n is the number of included firms with the same rating
CACi,t =
t∑
s=−k
ACi,s
Finally we find the Average of CAC (ACAC) of all companies that are in-
cluded in the index. Suppose there are M firms (in this case M = 24) that
are included into the index, then
ACACt =
1
M
M∑
i=1
CACi,t (2.1)
Since the index rolls every 6 months, we do an event study from t = −125
to t = 125. This corresponds to 6 months before and after the inclusion date
(t = 0). We count only trading days without weekends. The ACAC is shown
in Figure 2.1
From Figure 2.1, we can see that the ACAC is increasing around time
t = 0. In particular, if we look at the period around 1 month before and after
the inclusion (t = −20 to t = 20), we see a clear trend of positive ACAC.
Note that the CDSs are announced to be included into the index at t = −7.
The information about inclusion is incorporated into the price before the
inclusion date. This graph shows that there is an abnormal change in the
spreads when the CDS is included into the index, in a positive direction.
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Thus, we can conclude that the CDS market is not liquid from this event
study. Note that from the hypothesis, we do not specify that the change
should be positive or negative. We will discuss about possible reasons for the
observed positive spread changes in the robustness check section.
The tail of the graph is very volatile. This is because there are many
CDSs in our sample that are included just before the credit crisis. There
are 12 CDSs that are included into the CDX after March, 2007. The credit
crisis drives the CDS spreads high and volatile. However, if we look at a
short period around the inclusion date (t = −20 to t = 20), we can see the
inclusion effect without the effect from the credit crisis.
We compute the average of ACAC before and after inclusion. The average
of ACAC before inclusion is 9.86, while the average of ACAC after inclusion
is 36.46. The difference between the two is 36.46-9.86 = 26.6. This is in line
with our regression analysis before, where the coefficient of inclusion dummy
is about 30. Thus, the event study result does comply with our regression
result. However, we can see that the regression coefficient is in fact too high;
the highly volatile period at the tail is due to the credit crisis, and not due to
the inclusion effect. The inclusion effect is still visible around the inclusion
date, but the effect may not be as high as 30 basis points as our regression
analysis suggested.
The ACAC may not be an absolute measure of abnormal spread changes.
The average may be biased towards one outlier that outweighs other CDSs.
We consider another measure of abnormal spread changes: Median Cumula-
tive Abnormal Changes (MCAC). Instead of finding the average of CAC as
in Eq (2.1), we find the median of CAC. The result is shown in Figure 2.2.
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The dashed line is MCAC, while the solid line is ACAC. The MCAC is
much less volatile and much lower than the ACAC counterpart. This suggests
that indeed the ACAC is driven by a few highly volatile CDSs. However,
looking at the MCAC around the inclusion, we still see a positive inclusion
effect. In particular, from t = −8 to t = 28, or around 1-2 weeks before the
inclusion up to 1 month after inclusion, the median abnormal spread changes
are positive. The magnitude is rather small, but nonzero. The time period
is also in line with the CDX inclusion procedure, where a CDS is announced
to be included into the index 7 days before the roll date (t = −7). Thus,
even after using the median as a measure of abnormal changes, we can still
conclude that there is an abnormal spread change when a CDS is included
into the index.
The window we consider in the event study is quite long and many things
can happen during the 6-month period before and after inclusion. We now
consider a shorter window and calculate ACAC and MCMC using the same
procedure, only with t = −50 to t = 50. The result is reported in Figure 2.3.
Using the 50-day window, we can see the abnormal CDS spread changes
more clearly. The spread starts to increase 10 days before the inclusion
date. The change can go up to 5 basis points for the median and 15 basis
points for the mean, and then reverts back slowly to zero. This reversal helps
distinguish many explanations for the spread change, which we will discuss
more in the Interpretation section.
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2.5 Robustness Check
In the previous section we conclude that the CDS market is not liquid because
we observe abnormal spread changes when a CDS is included into the index.
In this section we discuss some robustness tests that we have not addressed in
the previous section. We will see that all other tests do support our evidence
in the previous section.
2.5.1 Exclusion Effect
If there is an inclusion effect, then there should be an exclusion effect too.
Once a CDS is included into the index, it can be excluded in the next roll
dates if the committee decides so. In our sample, there are 6 CDSs that are
dropped out of the index. We do the same event study but with exclusion as
an event. The time t = 0 indicates the date when the CDS is dropped out
of the index. We define ACAC in a similar manner. The result is shown in
Figure 2.4.
We can see the same pattern here, but in a reverse direction. Around the
date of exclusion, t = −6 to t = 10, the ACAC declines (almost) monotoni-
cally. This time period overlaps with the time when the committee decides
which CDS to be excluded from the index (t = −10). The abnormal changes
increase significantly long before the exclusion, and then decline steadily
through the exclusion date until long after the exclusion. Specifically in this
graph, the abnormal changes increase and peak at t = −43 and then decline
until date t = 70. The original increase of abnormal changes may be the rea-
son why the committee decides to drop these CDSs out of the index in the
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first place. Although the graph does not show a decline sharply only around
the exclusion date, it does not contradict our conjecture that inclusion effect
increases the spreads, while exclusion effect can decrease the spreads.
2.5.2 Correlation Change
Another way to detect the change in CDS liquidity is through correlations.
In the previous sections, we see the spread changes through the ”level”.
However, liquidity can also affect the correlation of CDS spreads with the
aggregate credit condition. For example, if the CDS market is already liquid,
then investors can buy and sell credit protection through the CDS market
and CDS spreads will quickly reflect the credit condition. Inclusion of CDS
into the CDX index should not affect the correlation of CDS and the credit
condition, which can be measured by the CDX index. However, if the CDS
market is not liquid, but the CDX index is more liquid, when a CDS is
included into the CDX, then the CDS spreads will have to adjust through
index arbitrage. The correlation between CDS spreads and the CDX index
after inclusion will be higher than before because CDS spreads can adjust
more quickly to the credit condition. In summary, our hypothesis is that if the
CDS market is illiquid, then when a CDS is included into the CDX index, the
correlation between CDS and CDX will increase. The other direction should
also be true. First we test the hypothesis for index inclusion and then move
on to index exclusion.
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Index Inclusion
We test the hypothesis by finding the correlation between the CDS spreads
and the most recent CDX index. In order to be comparable, we use the same
most recent CDX index before and after inclusion. For example, if a CDS
for firm A is included into CDX.NA.IG5, which has just been created, then
the correlation before inclusion is corr(∆CDS of A,∆CDX.NA.IG4) and the
correlation after inclusion is also corr(∆CDS of A, ∆CDX.NA.IG4). The
latter correlation should have been corr(∆CDS of A, ∆CDX.NA.IG5), but
in that case we won’t be able to compare the result with the correlation
before inclusion, when CDX.NA.IG5 does not exist yet. The correlations are
calculated over the period of 6 months before the inclusion and 6 months
after, corresponding to the rolling period.
We use weekly data for this test. We use CDX data from Bloomberg. The
CDX data are only from CDX.NA.IG5 to CDX.NA.IG9. The data before
the index 5 are too sparse to yield meaningful results, while the data after
the index 9 are over the time period for our CDS data. Out of 24 CDSs,
only 10 have enough data to yield meaningful results when calculating the
correlation. We report the result in Table 2.5.
Out of 10 CDSs, only 5 have increased correlations after being included
into the index. This result seems inconclusive. However, looking at the
standard deviation of ∆CDS before and after inclusion, we see some patterns
here. Some CDSs have much higher volatility after being included into the
index. This increase in volatility can be explained in two ways. First, after
being included into the index, the CDS becomes more liquid and the volatility
reflects the volatility of the market. In other words, it is easier to buy and
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sell credit protection and so the price adjusts according to the market. When
the market is not liquid, then the price doesn’t reflect the fundamentals and
can be sticky. Second, the increase in volatility has nothing to do with the
inclusion effect. It is due to the credit crisis and macro economy in general.
The first and second explanations are both valid and we do not have a way
to separate them. We then consider each case and its implication to our
hypothesis that the CDS market is illiquid.
1. If the increase in volatility reflects an increase in CDS liquidity, then we
should count the increase in volatility itself as an indicator of the change
in liquidity. We may not expect the correlation to increase in this case,
because higher volatility in the denominator will naturally decrease the
correlation coefficient. In Table 2.5, in the last column, we consider
the CDS as high volatility after inclusion if the standard deviation of
∆CDS after inclusion is more than 3 times higher than before. We then
count these high-volatility CDSs as reflecting the change in liquidity.
Thus, overall, there are 5 CDSs that change liquidity by high volatility
after inclusion, and 3 more CDSs that have higher correlations after
inclusion. A total of 8 out of 10 CDSs shows an increase in liquidity
after inclusion.
2. If the increase in volatility reflects the credit crisis or other factors un-
related to liquidity, we should take these CDSs out of our consideration
when considering the correlation change. Again, we cannot compare
the correlation meaningfully if the standard deviation before and after
are not comparable. We exclude the 5 CDSs with high volatility from
our consideration. Out of the remaining 5 CDSs, three have higher
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correlations after the inclusion. In this case, the evidence is not very
strong.
In sum we see that the evidence of correlation change after inclusion is not
very strong, though not in contradiction with our hypothesis.
Index Exclusion
In this section we test the hypothesis the other way around for index ex-
clusion. We follow the same methodology as for the index inclusion. There
6 CDSs that are excluded from the index that have enough data to yield
meaningful results. The result is reported in Table 2.6.
The change in correlations is also inconclusive for the exclusion case.
Out of 6 CDSs that are excluded, three have lower correlations and three
have higher correlations. Note that the standard deviations of ∆CDS do not
change significantly before and after exclusion. The last column of Table 2.6
shows the ratio of the standard deviations of ∆CDS after exclusion to those
before exclusion. Most numbers lie between 0.5 and 1.5 and we can conclude
that there is roughly no change in volatilities of CDSs after exclusion. This
observation is in contrast with the inclusion case. In Table 2.5, about half
of the CDSs that are included into the index have higher volatilities. The
exclusion and inclusion dates are in the same period, and so the difference
should not come from macro economic factors. Nevertheless, for the exclusion
effect, the liquidity change is also inconclusive.
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2.5.3 Bid-Ask Spreads As A Measure of Liquidity?
The first test of liquidity should have been bid-ask spreads. However, from
the data we do not see a significant change in the bid-ask spreads of CDS
before and after inclusion. Before the event, the average bid-ask spread is
6.2 basis points, and after the event, 6 basis points. Thus, looking at bid-ask
spreads will also provide inconclusive evidence of the liquidity of the CDS
market.
2.5.4 Alternative Explanations: Information or De-
mand Curves Sloping Down?
Another argument for the spread changes may be that index inclusion conveys
information about the underlying CDSs, and triggers the change of market
perception of the underlying credit risk. We argue that the information story
is unlikely. If the inclusion conveys information and we observe an increase
in spreads, it means that the index committee specifically selects high-risk
CDSs to be included into the index. This is not likely to be the purpose of
the index committee. The purpose of the index is to track the performance of
various segments of credit derivatives and to provide a benchmark for funds
that invest in similar products.
An alternative explanation is that index inclusion increases the demand
for individual CDSs. As demand increases, prices go up and this event shows
that demand curves slope down. The argument is similar to Shleifer (1986).
The paper investigates the positive abnormal returns to the stock index inclu-
sion and concludes that, because of the higher demand from index funds, the
47
demand curves slope down. Our paper is different in that our interested prod-
ucts are financial derivatives. Although there may be higher demand from
index inclusion, derivatives products are priced by a no-arbitrage principle
rather than the supply and demand effect. In other words, the derivatives
products are in zero net supply. In a perfectly liquid market, derivatives are
priced to match the expectation of the payoff from the underlying financial
products. If the CDS market is liquid, then we should see the CDS spreads
unchanged after inclusion.
2.6 Interpretation
In the hypothesis we only look for abnormal changes of the spreads when
liquidity changes. We do not specify whether the abnormal changes should
be positive or negative. It turns out that the abnormal changes are positive
when a CDS is included into the index. We offer here possible explanations.
A CDS is a contract between a buyer and a seller and the price, in a liquid
market, should reflect the market perception of credit risk. As a derivative
product, a CDS should be priced by a no-arbitrage principle reflecting the
credit risk of the fundamentals. When the market is not liquid, the price
may not perfectly reflect the credit risk of the underlying asset, but may
also depend on the supply and demand from the buyer and the seller or the
microstructure of the market.
In our case, we find an increase in the CDS spreads after being included
into the CDX index. The first explanation is that the demand for credit
risk from the buyer is higher than the supply from the seller. In an illiquid
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market, the buyer is willing to pay a higher price but there are not enough
sellers to sell credit protection. Or the market is illiquid such that it is costly
for the buyer who is willing to pay for a higher price, the marginal buyer, to
meet with the seller, and so the transactions do not occur. For example, there
may be a retail creditor who wants to buy credit protection but is not willing
to engage in the OTC negotiation process with large investment banks. In
sum, there are not enough players in the market that would drive the price
to the equilibrium. The CDS price in the illiquid market thus appears lower
than the credit risk of the fundamentals.
When a CDS is included into the CDX index, the liquidity changes. Wide
dealer and industry support allow for significant liquidity in the market.
Buying credit protection becomes easy in the standardized market. Now
the buyer can buy credit protection through the index with standardized
contracts. The seller is also more willing to sell credit protection through the
CDX market. The high demand from the buyer is met by the supply and
there are enough players in the market to drive the price to the equilibrium.
The price of individual CDSs need to adjust to the fundamentals, otherwise
there will be an index arbitrage opportunity. The CDS spreads increase
accordingly.
The second explanation is the order imbalance of end users causes price
impact, which depends on the direction of the dealers’ inventory. This ar-
gument is in line with Shachar (2012), Madhavan and Schmidt (1993) and
Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993). The basic mechanism is as follows. Cus-
tomers buy credit protection on the CDX index from the seller. The seller
hedges by buying protection on CDX components, i.e., individual CDSs.
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Thus, there is high demand for individual CDSs in the index. The dealers
who sell CDSs have to manage their inventory and this creates price impact
on the CDS spreads. In particular, with high demand, the dealers increase
the quoted prices so as to deter additional buyers and bring their inventory
to the preferred position. A closer look at the market microstructure level
should provide a clearer explanation for this argument.
The third explanation is that the credit risk actually increases with more
liquidity of the market. The argument is along the same line with Bolton and
Oehmke (2011). If the single name CDS market is illiquid, then it is hard
for creditors to seek default protection. It may not be of the best interest of
creditors to let the firms default. With the CDX index, creditors can easily
protect themselves from credit risk. Thus, they no longer have an incentive
to negotiate the firms out of default in distress periods. Credit risk increases
accordingly.
From our empirical evidence, it seems the second explanation about or-
der imbalance and dealers’ inventory is the most likely. The increase in CDS
spreads is impermanent and this should rule out the last explanation. More-
over, the correlation change is inconclusive and bid-ask spreads do not change
and this evidence should rule out the first explanation.
2.7 Conclusion and Future Work
We found evidence that the CDS market is not liquid. We focus our study on
the event when liquidity changes and observe the effect on the CDS spreads.
Our main hypothesis is that if the market condition becomes more liquid,
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but the CDS spreads do not change, it means that the original CDS market
is already liquid. If the spreads do change, then the original CDS market is
not liquid. The event is when a CDS is included into the CDX index, which
is more liquid than the original CDS market. We found that the CDS spreads
increase when the CDS is included into the index. The empirical results from
regression analysis and event study both point to the same conclusion. Since
the spreads change when the event occurs, we can conclude that the original
CDS market is not liquid.
We also use correlations as a measure of change for CDS spreads. Our
hypothesis is that the correlation between CDS spreads and the CDX index
should increase when the CDS market is more liquid because it is easier for
the spreads to adjust for different credit conditions. However, the empirical
result on correlation changes is still inconclusive. Moreover, bid-ask spreads
of CDS prices do not change after the inclusion.
Our hypothesis only indicates that there should be a change when liq-
uidity changes but does not specify the direction. We found that the change
is positive when a CDS is included into the index. One explanation is that
demand is higher than supply in the newly created market. When the market
is illiquid, there are not enough players in the market to drive the price to
the equilibrium, and so the price does not reflect the underlying credit risk.
When liquidity increases, the high demand from retail marginal buyers is met
with the supply, and so the price is higher than before. Another explana-
tion is that order imbalance of end users causes price impact because of the
dealers’ inventory. High demand for credit protection forces dealers to set
high prices for CDSs to deter future buyers and bring their inventory to the
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preferred position. The high demand is created when a CDS is included into
the CDX index which makes it become more popular. The final explanation
is that credit risk actually becomes higher after inclusion. Before inclusion,
it is hard for creditors to buy credit protection and thus they are more will-
ing to negotiate with distressed firms. After inclusion, creditors gain easy
protection and have more incentive to let the troubled firms default. The
impermanent price impact and inconclusive results on correlation changes
and bid-ask spreads suggest that the most likely explanation is the second
one on order imbalance and dealers’ inventory.
It is unfortunate that the CDS market is illiquid, and so the spreads many
not reflect ”pure” credit risk. The future work is to identify and disentangle
the illiquidity component from the credit risk component in CDS spreads.
The survey paper by Brigo, Predescu and Capponi (2010) may be a good
place to start. However, the definition and precise measurement for liquidity
remains elusive in the finance literature.
2.8 Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.1: Average Cumulative Abnormal Changes of CDS spreads around
the inclusion date. The cumulative abnormal changes are calculated from
the difference between the changes of CDS spreads of the included firm and
of other firms in the same rating. We then find the average of the cumulative
abnormal changes of all 24 included firms in our sample.
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Figure 2.2: Median Cumulative Abnormal Changes and Average Cumulative
Abnormal Changes. The cumulative abnormal changes are calculated from
the difference between the changes of CDS spreads of the included firm and
of other firms in the same rating. We then find the median and the average
of the cumulative abnormal changes of all 24 included firms in our sample,
shown in dashed and solid line respectively.
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Figure 2.3: Median Cumulative Abnormal Changes and Average Cumula-
tive Abnormal Changes, using a 50-day window. The cumulative abnor-
mal changes are calculated from the difference between the changes of CDS
spreads of the included firm and of other firms in the same rating. We then
find the median and the average of the cumulative abnormal changes of all
24 included firms in our sample, shown in dashed and solid line respectively.
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Figure 2.4: Average Cumulative Abnormal Changes for excluded CDSs.
There are 6 CDSs in our sample that are dropped out of the index
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of CDS spreads
There are 24 CDSs that are included into the index during our study period,
January 2004 to May 2008. The statistics are calculated from monthly data.
Trading Symbol N Mean Median Min Max Standard Deviation
AZO 52 67.48 68.95 27.7 126.8 24.68
BC 52 68.43 54.65 22.9 280 57.17
BSX 52 75.12 42.80 16.2 310 74.51
CAH 52 46.03 35.35 16.5 135.8 26.24
CTL 52 75.66 71.10 39.5 148.3 24.37
DRI 52 54.22 43.70 26 201.1 38.00
FO 52 50.49 45.75 10.5 206.7 40.60
GCI 52 52.17 38.80 19.8 245 46.08
GPS 52 91.57 92.50 45 142.2 22.39
HD 52 31.34 12.65 8 196.4 43.20
HOT 52 128.95 120.25 62.8 267.5 43.50
JCP 52 94.86 81.45 35.5 238.8 51.83
KSS 52 44.20 31.90 19 163.8 36.54
LEN 52 155.63 73.15 44.5 844.8 198.18
LIZ 52 79.90 50.15 30 385 85.58
MAS 52 66.12 47.20 27.5 293.2 57.56
MCK 52 44.23 36.30 17 99 20.68
MDC 52 103.24 89.50 49.7 210 39.26
MMC 52 58.11 49.20 29 152.3 26.01
OLN 52 89.79 75.60 47.5 223.1 37.74
RDN 52 173.41 52.70 29.7 1040.1 282.53
RSH 52 113.69 119.75 27.5 319.6 64.75
TIN 52 88.83 77.60 34 288.3 52.54
WEN 52 112.11 106.25 30.5 337.5 73.29
Total 1248 81.90 60.00 8 1040.10 90.51
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Table 2.2: Industry classification
The included firms are classified into each industry according to the Siccodes
on Kenneth French’s website.
Number Industry Number of firms
1 Consumer Nondurables 2
2 Consumer Durables 0
3 Manufacturing 4
4 Energy 0
5 Hi-tech 0
6 Telecom 1
7 Wholesale, Retail 10
8 Healthcare 1
9 Utilities 0
10 Other: Mines, Trans,Const, Finance, etc 6
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Table 2.3: Regression on inclusion dummy variable
The table shows the OLS regression result of CDS spreads on the inclusion
dummy variable (=1 when the CDS is included into the index). Standard
errors are in parentheses.(***significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5%
level, * significant at 10% level)
Explanatory Variables (1)
Constant 56.34∗∗∗
(3.18)
Inclusion 60.41∗∗∗
(4.90)
Obs 1248
R2 0.11
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Table 2.4: Regression with control variables
The table shows OLS regressions with many well-known financial variables
that affect CDS spreads. In the first 3 columns, the dependent variable
is CDS spreads. In the last 2 column, the dependent variable is log(CDS
spreads). Firm’s fixed effect is applied to all regressions. Standard errors
are in parentheses.(***significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, *
significant at 10% level)
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 175.37∗∗∗ 198.56∗∗∗ 247.33∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗
(19.84) (20.14) (24.92) (0.11) (0.12)
Inclusion 30.86∗∗∗ 31.75∗∗∗ 29.30∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(4.40) (4.52) (4.37) (0.03) (0.03)
Ratings 11.23∗∗∗ 13.99∗∗∗ 10.92∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(2.40) (2.50) (2.38) (0.01) (0.01)
3-month int. rate 11.21∗∗∗ 13.21∗∗∗ 0.08)∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(3.33) (3.41) (0.02) (0.02)
5-year int. rate −55.25∗∗∗ −62.81∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗
(7.11) (7.23) (0.04) (0.04)
log(3-month int. rate) 28.21∗∗∗
(7.35)
log(5-year int. rate) −208.85∗∗∗
(22.33)
Leverage 502.81∗∗∗ 495.17∗∗∗ 4.47∗∗∗
(47.50) (47.28) (0.27)
log(Leverage) 42.55∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
(6.30) (0.04)
Index Returns −231.69∗∗∗ −231.25∗∗∗ −199.87∗∗ −1.76∗∗∗ −1.77∗∗∗
(83.43) (85.64) (83.37) (0.47) (0.50)
Obs 1196 1196 1196 1196 1196
R2 0.35 0.32 0.36 0.55 0.53
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Table 2.5: Change in correlations after inclusion
This table shows the correlation between CDS spreads and CDX index be-
fore and after inclusion. The number pairs in parentheses are the standard
deviations of ∆CDS and ∆CDX index, respectively. The fifth column shows
the change in correlations. The last column indicates whether the standard
deviation of CDS spreads after inclusion is much higher than before inclusion
(≥ 3 times), in which case it may not make sense to compare correlations.
Trading Symbol Inclusion Date Correlation Before Correlation After Change(After -Before) High Volatility After?
HOT 9/21/2006 0.57 -0.07 -0.64
(7.18 , 2.48) (9.52 , 1.35)
OLN 9/21/2006 0.06 0.40 0.34
(5.31 , 2.48) (8.20 , 1.35)
BSX 3/21/2007 0.13 0.33 0.20 yes
(8.52 , 1.37) (33.56 , 1.37)
JCP 3/21/2007 0.34 0.81 0.47
(4.02 , 1.37) (13.05 , 1.37)
RDN 3/21/2007 0.89 0.52 -0.37 yes
(7.23 , 1.37) (146.33 , 1.37)
DRI 9/21/2007 0.31 0.42 0.11 yes
(5.61 , 8.13) (23.47 , 10.87)
FO 9/21/2007 0.49 0.51 0.02
(5.77 , 8.13) (12.03 , 10.87)
GCI 9/21/2007 0.61 0.44 -0.18 yes
(5.27 , 8.13) (22.09 , 10.87)
HD 9/21/2007 0.79 0.60 -0.19
(4.65 , 8.13) (13.59 , 10.87)
LIZ 9/21/2007 0.37 0.31 -0.06 yes
(6.64 , 8.13) (32.48 , 10.87)
61
Table 2.6: Change in correlations after exclusion
This table shows the correlation between CDS spreads and CDX index before
and after exclusion. The number pairs in parentheses are the standard devi-
ations of ∆CDS and ∆CDX index, respectively. The fifth column shows the
change in correlations. The last column shows the ratio of standard deviation
of CDS spreads after to before exclusion.
Trading Symbol Exclusion Date Correlation Before Correlation After Change(After -Before) Stdev After / Stdev Before
WEN 9/21/2006 0.55 0.39 -0.16 0.97
(6.47 , 2.48) (6.27 , 1.35)
GPS 3/21/2007 0.57 0.58 0.01 1.46
(11.36 , 1.37) (16.62 , 1.37)
RSH 3/21/2007 0.07 0.75 0.69 1.76
(12.84 , 1.37) (22.59 , 1.37)
BSX 9/21/2007 0.56 0.77 0.21 0.58
(34.21 , 8.13) (19.83 , 10.87)
OLN 9/21/2007 0.78 0.67 -0.11 1.12
(15.34 , 8.13) (17.22 , 10.87)
TIN 9/21/2007 0.89 0.71 -0.19 1.03
(19.81 , 8.13) (20.38 , 10.87)
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Chapter 3
The Recovery Factor in Credit
Default Swaps
3.1 Introduction
Credit derivatives provide insurance against the risk of a default by a par-
ticular company or country on its bonds. The price of credit derivatives
depends on two main factors: the risk-neutral probability of default and the
risk-neutral recovery rates. Research on credit derivatives focuses mostly on
the first factor, while regarding the second factor as a constant at about
0.4-0.5 of the face value. However, recent research has found that the re-
alized recovery factor is not constant, and exhibits fluctuations as large as
0.2-0.7. Moreover, the realized recovery rates exhibit a high correlation with
the probability of default, i.e., recovery rates are low when default rates are
high, and vice versa.
Recovery rates are hard to capture in the pricing model. First of all,
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defaults are rare and thus recoveries are also rare. As a consequence, we do
not know much about both default probabilities and recovery rates and what
the right statistics should be. Models for defaults have been developed and
enable researchers to use CDS prices to back out implied default probabilities
instead of using the historical default data. CDS spreads are also more
informative about default than bond prices, since the bond market is much
more complicated and less liquid than the credit market. Longstaff et al.
(2005) uses CDS information to measure the size of default in corporate
bond spreads, indicating the belief that CDS prices measure ”pure” default
risk. However, if recovery rates are important in the price and we do not
understand this factor, then the credit pricing model cannot be complete,
and the implied default probabilities may not be correct.
The information from CDS spreads is crucial for risk managers. Even
though CDSs are priced in the risk-neutral measure and the implied default
probabilities are in the risk-neutral world, the spreads are informative about
the market view of default probabilities. Risk managers can use this infor-
mation to construct their portfolios even though all they care about is the
”physical” default. Implied recovery rates from CDS spreads can play the
same role to the risk managers – they are informative about the market view
of recovery rates.
In this paper we seek to understand and parametrize the risk-neutral
recovery rates in CDS. We first detect the recovery factor in CDS using the
unique characteristic of ex post recovery rates. Having learned that recovery
rates are stochastic with a particular pattern, we proceed to modify the credit
pricing model to capture this empirical fact. Along the process, we also
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contribute to the empirical determinants of CDS spreads. The theoretical
factors and other control variables can explain up to 90% (65% without fixed
effects) of the CDS spreads in panel data, confirming that our pricing model
works well with this seemingly complicated product.
Empirically, it has been difficult to separate the effect of risk-neutral re-
covery rates from the risk-neutral probability of default. The main difficulty
is that both factors, which are stochastic with high correlations, are multi-
plied together to form a price. Moreover, it is not clear whether the recovery
factor is incorporated into the price of credit derivatives ex ante. Empirical
evidence that the recovery rates exhibit high correlations with default rates
is found ”after” the default occurs. Does the market incorporate this ex post
result into the ex ante price before default? If so, do ex ante (risk-neutral)
recovery rates exhibit the same characteristics as the ex post (physical) re-
covery rates?
We establish the fact that recovery rates are priced into the credit deriva-
tives ex ante, in addition to the effect of the probability of default. The key
to distinguish the effect of recovery rates from the probability of default is
industry characteristics and industry distress factors. Following Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) and Acharya et al. (2007), we know that recovery rates de-
pend on industry characteristics and industry distress. The main drivers for
recoveries are asset-specific recovery rates and the fire-sales effect. These two
factors determine the recovery rates, in addition to effect of the probability
of default. Using these two factors, and controlling for other factors that
affect the CDS spreads, including the probability of default, we can detect
the recovery factor in credit derivative prices.
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This paper builds on the empirical findings on realized recovery rates.
The three main papers in this area are Altman et al. (2005), Shleifer and
Vishny (1992), and Acharya et al. (2007). Altman et al. (2005) finds that
realized recovery rates are negatively correlated with the aggregate default
rates. They explain that recovery rates are basically a function of supply and
demand of the defaulted securities. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) explores the
determinants of the liquidation values of assets. We quote from the abstract:
”When a firm in financial distress needs to sell assets, its industry peers are
likely to be experiencing problems themselves, leading to asset sales at prices
below value in best use. Such illiquidity makes assets cheap in bad times,
and so ex ante is a significant private cost of leverage”. The main insight for
recovery rates comes from the following observations:
• Asset Redeployability: Assets which are redeployable have high liqui-
dation values. If they are managed improperly, the creditors can take
the assets away and redeploy them. In general, asset redeployabil-
ity depends on the industry the firms are in. For example, commercial
land can be used for many different purposes, while insurance contracts
may not be used for any other purposes. We call this factor industry
characteristics.
• Asset Specificity: Assets which are specialized can be best used by
specialists in the same industry. For example, aircrafts are best used
by airline companies, but not retailers. When industry buyers cannot
buy the assets and industry outsiders face significant costs of acquiring
and managing the assets, assets in liquiditation will have low recovery
rates. This scenario can happen when the industry is in distress. Thus,
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we call this factor industry distress.
Apparently the determinants of recovery rates in Shleifer and Vishny (1992)
are different from Altman et al. (2005). Acharya et al. (2007) shows em-
pirically that creditors of defaulted firms recover significantly lower amounts
when the industry of the defaulted firms is in distress. The authors inves-
tigate whether the result is purely an economic-downturn effect or also a
fire-sales effect along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny. They find that the
fire-sales effect is also at work; creditors recover less if the industry is in dis-
tress and non-defaulted firms in the industry are illiquid, particularly if the
assets are specific to the industry.
They study realized (ex post) recovery rates and find that industry char-
acteristics and industry distress have a significant role in determining the
recovery rates, even after controlling for the ex ante probability of default.
They conclude that in addition to (and possibly instead of) the illiquidity
in the financial market for trading defaulted instruments, illiquidity in the
market for the sale of real assets is important in understanding creditor re-
coveries.
With these results on the recovery rates, we should expect to see similar
effects of the risk-neutral recovery rates on CDS spreads. In particular, we
should detect the effect of industry characterisitcs and industry distress on
the CDS spreads. This will be our main empirical test.
Few papers explore the implied (risk-neutral) recovery rates in fixed in-
come products. The closest ones are Bakshi et al. (2006), Le (2007) and Pan
and Singleton (2008). We mention each of them here and specify how our
paper is different.
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Bakshi et al. (2006) explores the role of recovery in default risk models.
They find that the recovery rate as a fraction of face value (RFV) fits the
data the best. They specify the theoretical price for defaultable bonds, and
then extract the implied recovery rates from the bond data. Their empir-
ical results show that there is a relationship between risk-neutral expected
default rates and risk-neutral expected recovery rates in bond prices. On
average, a 4% worsening in the risk-neutral hazard rate is associated with a
1% decline in risk-neutral recovery rates. Our paper is different from their
paper in a few aspects. First, we use credit derivative data which are rela-
tively new compared to bond data. Most of the industrial credit models still
assume that recovery rates are constant. Although there is a relationship
between expected default rates and recovery rates in the bond market, it is
not clear, or not established, that market participants in the credit market
take this relationship into account. Second, in their model, the risk-neutral
recovery rates depend on only the risk-neutral probability of default. In our
paper, we specify that the risk-neutral recovery rates depend on industry
characteristics and industry distress, which turn out to correlate with the
probability of default. Third, they use a reduced-form model while we use
a structural model for default risk. The probability of default in a struc-
tural model is clearly defined with a closed-form solution. In a reduced-form
model, the probability of default is an (unobserved) Poisson jump process.
This difference may affect how we estimate the probability of default, and
correspondingly, the recovery rates, which are highly correlated.
Le (2007) proposes a framework to separate risk-neural recovery rates
and risk-neutral probability of default. The key is to use equity derivatives
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to back out the probability of default, and then use that probability to price
a CDS of the same firm. Given that we know the probability of default,
the remaining factor that drives CDS spreads must be the recovery rates.
The paper also finds that the probability of default and expected recovery
rates are positively correlated. The motivation of his paper is similar to
ours. However, our paper is more focused on which factor determines the
expected recovery rates, rather than the general framework to separate the
recovery rates and the probability of default. Since we know the factors that
drive ex post (physical) recovery rates, we can use those factors to detect the
effect of ex ante (risk-neutral) recovery rates. With this extra knowledge, we
only need the CDS spreads and not equity options prices. The ultimate goal
of our paper is to parametrize the stochastic recovery rates to price credit
derivatives, and so our approach is more straightforward and less cumbersome
but possibly lacks the generality as in Le (2007). Moreover, the recovery rates
are stochastic in time series while Le (2007) only explores the determinants
of recovery rates in cross section.
Pan and Singleton (2008) explores the nature of default arrival and recov-
ery rates implicit in the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads. They use
time series of CDS to estimate the default arrival and recovery rates. How-
ever, the paper still sets recovery rates as a constant, arguing that this is the
industry standard and recoveries tend to be constant for sovereign debts. Our
paper uses corporate CDS data instead of sovereign CDS data. Moreover,
the main point of our paper is that the ex ante recovery rates are stochastic,
thus setting recovery rates as a constant is not an option. Finally, our paper
uses a structural model while their paper uses a reduced-form model.
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To be consistent with the empirical findings, we incorporate the stochas-
tic recovery rates into the credit risk model. We use the first-passage-time
structural model to calculate the probability of default. We parametrize the
recovery rate so that it depends on industry characteristics and industry
distress, as suggested by the data. This step links the unobserved ex ante
(risk-neutral) recovery rates to observable parameters such as industry index.
We then calibrate the model to the data to find the value of parameters for
risk-neutral recovery rates. The result is that the risk-neutral recovery rate
will be lower by 20% if the industry is in distress during the firm’s default.
The model can be used to learn about the expected recovery rates across
business cycles and it is possible to get the number different from 20% if
calibrated to the data in different periods.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the CDS pricing
model. Section 3.3 describes how to calculate the probability of default.
Section 3.4 describes the CDS data. Section 3.5 is an empirical analysis of the
implied recovery factor in CDS. Section 3.6 is a robustness check. Section 3.7
describes the theoretical model we derive to capture the empirical findings.
We then conclude in the final section.
3.2 CDS Pricing Model
In this section we introduce the CDS pricing model that will incorporate
all the factors needed to be considered in the empirical analysis. A Credit
Default Swap (CDS) is a contract that provides insurance against the risk of
a default by a particular company. The company is known as the reference
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entity and a default by the company is known as a credit event. The buyer
of this contract obtains the right to sell bonds issued by the reference entity
for their face value when a credit event occurs. On the other hand, the CDS
seller agrees to buy the bonds for their face value when a credit event occurs,
thus bearing the risk of default.
The CDS buyer makes periodic payments to the seller until the end of
the life of the CDS or until a credit event occurs. The settlement, in the
event of a default, involves either physical delivery of the bonds or a cash
payment. The observable quantity in the market is the payment by the CDS
buyer, also known as CDS spreads. The CDS spreads in a liquid market
reflect the fair price for default insurance, i.e., the spreads must make the
expected value of the buyer’s periodic payments equal to the expected value
of the seller’s losses in case of default.
In a no-arbitrage model, the CDS spreads should make the present value
of payments from the buyer (fixed leg) equal to the present value of losses by
the seller (contingent leg). Let S be the CDS spread and R the risk-neutral
expected recovery rate if default occurs. Let Q(t) be the risk-neutral cumu-
lative probability of default up to time t, thus the risk-neutral probability of
survival up to time t = 1−Q(t). Let d be the accrual days between payment
dates, for example, if the payments are made quarterly, then d = 0.25. Let
D(t) be the discount factor. Then
PV [fixed leg] =
N∑
i=1
D(ti)(1−Q(ti))Sdi
PV [contingent leg] = (1−R)
N∑
i=1
D(ti)(Q(ti)−Q(ti−1))
The first equation represents the expected payment from the buyer, by mul-
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tiplying payments with the probability of survival. The second equation
represents the expected payment from the seller, by multiplying the pay-
ment in case of default with the default probability. By equating the two
present values, we can represent S as:
S =
(1−R)
N∑
i=1
D(ti)(Q(ti)−Q(ti−1))
N∑
i=1
D(ti)(1−Q(ti))di
(3.1)
The above equation is for discrete time. The continuous-time model uses the
same intuition. We take CDS spread formula, given for the contract starting
from time 0 to T , from Hull, Predescu and White (2009):
S =
(1− Rˆ)(1 + a∗)
T∫
0
q(u)v(u)du
T∫
0
q(u)[h(u) + e(u)]du+ (1−
T∫
0
q(u)du)h(T ))
(3.2)
where
T : The period of the contract
q(u) : Probability density function (pdf) of default at time u in a risk-neutral
world
Rˆ : Expected recovery rate on the reference obligation in a risk-neutral world
h(u) : Present value of payments at the rate $1 per year on payment dates
between time zero and time u
e(u) : Present value of accrual payment at time u equal to u− u∗ where u∗
is the payment date immediately preceding time u
v(u) : Present value of $1 received at time u
a∗ : Average value of accrued interest rate on the reference obligation for the
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period 0 to T
We will use the discrete-time model to guide our empirical analysis, but
we will use the continuous-time model when we modify the recovery rate
function in the theoretical section. From (3.1), we can see that the factors
that affect CDS spreads are the risk-neutral probability of default, the risk-
neutral recovery rate, and the interest rate (discount factor). In this paper,
for simplicity, we assume the interest rate is constant when investors price
the financial instruments. We can then write D(t) = e−rt.
3.3 The Probability of Default
There are two main approaches to model the probability of default: struc-
tural models and reduced-form models. A structural model characterizes
defaults as asset values falling below default barriers. A reduced-form model
abstracts away from the fundamentals of the firms and characterizes defaults
as a Poisson process. The advantage of a structural model is that it is eco-
nomically intuitive, while the advantage of a reduced-form model is that it
is easier to fit the data to the ”unobserved” default intensity. In this pa-
per we only use a structural model approach. The choice here is not only
because of the economic intuition, but also because we will incorporate the
results from corporate finance into the recovery factor. In corporate finance
models, assets and debts have ”physical” meaning, not just a mathematical
concept, and so we do not want to abstract away from the physical model.
We would like to have a unified view of default processes and recoveries in a
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single model.
In a structural model, firms default when they cannot fulfill financial
obligations. In mathematical terms, the firm defaults when its value falls
below the debt barrier. The first generation model by Merton calculates
the probability of default at the date of debt maturity, for example 1 year
from now. The firm can only default at the date of debt maturity. The
next generation of model, pioneered by Black and Cox (1976), characterizes
default as the first passage time of the firm value across the debt barrier.
In this model firms can default any time between now and the date of debt
maturity. Mathematically it is much harder to calculate the first passage time
density as in the Black and Cox model than to calculate the probability of
default at maturity date as in the Merton model. In empirical analysis section
we use the probability of default from the Merton model, which was modified
by Bharath and Shumway (2008). We briefly describe the calculation method
here.
In the risk-neutral measure, the (unobserved) value of a firm follows a
geometric Brownian motion
dV = rV dt+ σV V dW
Q (3.3)
which is a standard setup and r is the risk-free rate. The firm issues a
discounted bond maturing at time T. Under this assumption, the equity of
the firm is a call option on the underlying value with a strike price equal to
the face value of the firm’s debt and a time-to-maturity of T . The value of
equity as a function of the unobserved total value of a firm can be described
by the Black-Scholes-Merton formula.
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Specifically, Merton shows that the equity value of a firm satisfies
E = VN(d1)− e−rTFN(d2) (3.4)
where E is the market value of the firm’s equity, F is the face value of debt,
N(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, d1 is calculated
from
d1 =
ln(V/F ) + (r + 1
2
σ2V T )
σV
√
T
(3.5)
and d2 = d1 − σV
√
T
The Merton model links the unobserved total value of the firm to the
observed equity value. Moreover, with a closed-form expression, we can link
the volatility of the firm to the valatility of the equity. It follows from Ito’s
lemma that
σE =
(
V
E
)
∂E
∂V
σV
=
(
V
E
)
N(d1)σV (3.6)
where the second line comes from the fact that ∂E
∂V
= N(d1) from the partial
derivative of Eq(3.4).
From Eq(3.4) and Eq(3.6), we have two equations and two unknowns (V
and σV ). Thus, we can solve for the unobserved variables V and σV , given
the value of E and σE.
Once we solve for V and σV , risk-neutral the distance to default (DD)
can be calculated as
DD =
ln(V/F ) + (r − 1
2
σ2V )
σV
√
T
(3.7)
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and then the risk-neutral probability of default (PD) is given by
PD = N(−DD) (3.8)
The probability of default here characterizes the probability that the firm
value will fall below the face value of debt at maturity.
While the mentioned method is straightforward, it involves solving si-
multaneous equations for every observation. In the paper by Bharath and
Shumway (2008), the authors explore an alternative way to calculate the
probability of default. The method is based on the same economic intu-
ition about the default process, but does not require solving simultaneous
equations. We briefly describe their method here:
To begin, they approximate the market value of each firm’s debt with the
face value of its debt,
DBS = F (3.9)
Where BS stands for Bharath-Shumway. The volatility of the debt is corre-
lated with the equity volatility
σD,BS = 0.05 + 0.25 ∗ σE (3.10)
The 5 percent represents the term structure volatility and the 25 percent
times equity volatility represents the volatility associated with the default
risk. Thus, the approximation of the total volatility of the firm is calculated
by
σV,BS =
E
E +DBS
σE +
DBS
E +DBS
σD,BS
=
E
E + F
σE +
F
E + F
(0.05 + 0.25 ∗ σE) (3.11)
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This approximation captures the same information that is captured by the
Merton model, but without having to solve simultaneous equations. The
naive distance to default is then given by:
DDBS =
ln((E + F )/F ) + (r − 1
2
σ2V,BS)
σV,BS
√
T
(3.12)
The DDBS is easy to compute and also represents the same information as
the Merton DD. Finally the probability of default is given by
PDBS = N(−DDBS) (3.13)
In section 4.5 of Bharath and Shumway (2008), the authors regress the log of
CDS spreads with the log of PDBS and compare the result with the regression
with the log of Merton PD. It should be noted that they use 1-year PD
while the CDS contract is 5-year. The reason is that 1-year PD is highly
correlated with 5-year PD, and the log specification of this regression makes
the intercept reflect the average level of the probability. The regression results
show that both variables are statistically significant, but the R2 of log(PDBS)
is higher than log(Merton PD). Moreover, when adding both PDBS and
Merton PD in the same regression, the statistical significance of the Merton
PD is driven out by the PDBS. They conclude that the functional form of
the probability of default is more important than the solution procedure.
Due to the result of this paper and relative ease of computation, we will
use the PDBS in our empirical analysis instead of the original Merton PD.
We have explained the determinants and calculation of the recovery rates
and the probability of default. We are now ready for the empirical analysis
of the CDS spreads.
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3.4 Data
We use CDS data from Credit Market Analysis (CMA), acquired by CME
on March 25, 2008. The data are daily ranging from January 2004 to May
2008. For this paper we use only 5-year CDS data because they are the most
common and most liquid. From daily data, we change the interval to monthly,
because it is known that the CDS spreads have high autocorrelations, possibly
because of illiquidity. We use the spreads at the end of month as monthly
data. We match firms in our CDS dataset with CRSP database using Ticker
symbols. The summary statistics of the CDS data are presented in Table
3.9.
To detect the effect of recovery rates, we use industry dummy variables
and industry distress indicators. The industry dummy variables are assigned
according to the firm’s Siccode. We divide firms into 10 industries based on
the Siccodes on Kenneth French’s website. The percentage of firms in each
industry in our dataset is shown in Table 3.2.
The industry distress indicators need to signify the state of the industry.
According to Acharya et al. (2007), there are various ways to define industry
distress. The first is that the median stock return for the industry of the
defaulting firm falls below -30% annually. This accounts for 9% of the sample
data. The second is that one-year or two-year median sales growth for the
industry is negative. The third is that the average credit rating of other
firms in the industry is below investment grade. The three proxies give
similar results in their paper and the first proxy is used for all subsequent
analyses.
Following the first proxy of industry distress, we use the 10th percentile
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as a cutoff for distress. If the industry return for that month is less than
the 10th percentile, then industry distress indicator is 1, otherwise it is 0.
We use the 10th percentile cutoff here to be consistent with the literature
but the result is also robust to other cutoff levels. The cutoff comes from
the historical data of industry returns for each industry during the 10-year
period of 1994-2003. The distress cutoff for each industry is shown in Table
3.3.
To control for the probability of default, we calculate the probability of
default using PDBS as described in the last section. We use the equity data
from CRSP and the debt data from Compustat. Following Bharath and
Shumway (2008), the face value of debt (F ) is calculated as (short-term debt
+ 0.5*long-term debt). The equity volatility (σE) is also calculated from
monthly returns from CRSP, and then adjusted to annual scale. We use the
risk-free rate r = 2.5% for the drift in the risk-neutral measure. We want to
fix the interest rate effect in the probability of default. This assumption may
be relaxed and the main result still goes through.
Another important proxy for the probability of default is the firm’s rat-
ings. In theoretical models, PD should be sufficient statistics that capture
all the information of default probabilities. However, in the data, ratings
are significant in explaining credit spreads even after controlling for PD
(Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002)). Even though ratings reflect physical instead of
risk-neutral probability of default, the two must be highly correlated, and we
can use one as a proxy for another in the regression analysis. Thus, in the
regression we include the probability of default as reflected by the firm’s rat-
ings. We use S&P ratings available on Compustat. We then convert ratings
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into the equivalent probability of default using Moody’s corporate idealized
5-year cumulative probability of default rates.
Other factors that may affect CDS spreads include interest rates as a
discount factor. We use Treasury bill rates of maturity 3-month and 5-year
as a control. These are the shortest and longest maturity interest rates that
may affect CDS spreads. Investors may use different interest rates to discount
cash flows, but they should be in the range of these short and long term rates,
or their linear combination. In the empirical analysis, we only include these
two rates. The data are also from CRSP.
3.5 Empirical Results
The main hypothesis to test here is whether recovery rates are incorporated
into the CDS spreads, ex ante. The results from Acharya et al. indicate that
industry characteristics and industry distress determine physical recovery
rates, ex post, in addition to the risk-neutral probability of default. We
will then look for the significance of industry dummy variables and industry
distress indicators in the regression with CDS data. The result is shown in
Table 3.4.
The first column shows the full regression while the second column shows
the regression without the industry condition (only the probability of default
and interest rates). The R2 in the second column decreases from the first
column by about 0.034 or 3.4%. The industry condition can explain about
3.4% of the CDS spreads. Most of the variations in CDS spreads indeed
come from the probability of default. However, the industry condition is also
80
highly significant and the economic magnitude is big, especially for Distress.
We now focus on the significance of the coefficients in the first column.
After controlling for the probability of default and interest rates, the in-
dustry dummy variables and industry distress indicators are still statistically
significant. The variables I1 − I9 are industry dummy variables, where I1
= 1 if the firm is in industry number 1 and 0 otherwise, and similarly for I2
to I9. Note that we cannot include I10 in the regression, otherwise we will
get a linearly dependent vector of I10 with I1 to I9. The industry effect of
I10 is absorbed into the intercept in the regression. All the industry dummy
variables are significant. This indicates that the industry-specific asset is an
important factor to determine the expected recovery rates in CDS spreads.
However, in this paper we put more focus on the Distress factor, which is
time-varying. The industry dummy can be regarded as a constant which can
vary by industry but will not explain the time-varying patterns of recovery
rates over time.
The variables Distress and lag(Distress) stand for the industry distress
indicator and its 1-month lag. Both variables are significant and the sign is
positive as expected. If the industry is in distress, then the recovery rates will
be lower because it is hard to sell assets to non-defaulted firms in the same
industry. Thus, fire-sales effect, which will occur when the industry is in
distress, is also priced into the CDS spreads. The lag of Distress is included
in the regression because we doubt that the CDS market may not be liquid
and thus the information of Distress may take time to be incorporated into
the price. Indeed, the lag of Distress is also significant in the regression.
We will discuss more about illiquidity effect in the robustness check section.
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The magnitude of Distress is 0.4, which is very big in a log scale. This
translates to about e0.4 - 1 = 0.5 or 50% decline in expected risk-neutral
recovery rates if the industry is in distress. This extreme magnitude can
have many interpretations. First, it can mean that investors are very risk-
averse about recovery rates and thus a sharp decline in expected recoveries in
distress. Second, it can mean that our Distress condition is too extreme and
thus the resulting magnitude is too high. Third, it can mean that Distress
is a proxy for some other factors as well, for example illiquidity and time-
varying risk premium. We will see that the third explanation is the most
plausible and we provide evidence in the robustness check section.
Probability of Default (PD) and Interest Rates are included as control
variables in the regression. With control variables, we make sure that indus-
try characteristics and industry distress variables are significant because of
recovery rates, not the probability of default or other factors. Note that PD
and interest rates are also significant in the regression as we expect from the
theoretical formula. However, we focus only on the recovery rates and do not
go into details about these two factors in this paper.
Since this is a panel regression, we should also control for the firm fixed
effect and time fixed effect. We do the same regression with firm and time
fixed effects and the result is shown in Table 3.5.
The first column is the same as the first column in the previous table. In
the second column we add firm fixed effect and yearly time fixed effect. In
the third column we add firm fixed effect and monthly time fixed effect.
As we can see from the second column, some of the industry characteris-
tics (I1 − I9) lose statistical significance. This result is as expected. When
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we control for finer information (firm-level), then the cruder information
(industry-level) is no longer significant. The coefficients for Distress and
lag(Distress) are still significant although the magnitude is slightly smaller
than the first column. Note that the R2 jumps by almost 20% when we
include firm and time fixed effect.
In the third column, we see the same result for industry characteristics
(I1−I9). However, Distress and lag(Distress) have much lower magnitude
than before, although they are still highly significant. When we control
for time fixed effect at the monthly level, then this information is highly
correlated with Distress. Industry conditions are highly correlated with the
economy and month fixed effect may be a proxy for the state of the economy
for a given month. Nevertheless, after controlling for month fixed effect,
Distress is still highly significant. This means that the industry condition
does affect the recovery rates and this factor is not purely driven by the
macro economy.
3.6 Robustness Check
The results from the last section indicate that industry characteristics and
industry distress are significant in determining CDS spreads. In other words,
the recovery factor is priced into CDS spreads ex ante. In this section,
we check for the robustness of the result. In particular, we check whether
other factors may affect CDS spreads and make industry characteristics and
industry distress no more statistically significant in the empirical analysis.
The first factor is the state of the economy. Obviously the state of the
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economy will affect the probability of default, recovery rates and interest
rates and thus the CDS spreads. It can also affect the level of risk-aversion
of investors and change the probability in the risk-neutral measure. We
control for the state of the economy by using the S&P500 index returns from
CRSP.
The second factor is the state of the industry. Acharya et al. (2007)
indicate that the continuous industry returns have no effect on recovery rates
ex post, only the industry distress does. However, ex ante, industry returns
may affect the expected recovery rates. Moreover, the industry returns may
affect the probability of default. Thus, the industry returns can affect the
CDS spreads and we include them as a control variable. We use industry
returns data from Kenneth French’s website.
The third factor is illiquidity. In a liquid market, the CDS spreads should
reflect a fair price. However, in an illiquid market, it can be the case that
CDS spreads are higher because no one is willing to provide credit protec-
tion. Illiquidity usually happens during the distressed period. Also, different
industries may have different liquidity for CDS protection. Thus, our results
in the previous section may reflect market illiquidity factor, not the recovery
factor in CDS spreads. For robustness check, we control for the illiquidity
factor.
In the literature it is still not clear how to measure illiquidity. The main
indicator of illiquidity is bid-ask spreads. However, it is not clear what func-
tional form of illiquidity affects the price. Here we control for illiquidity by
using the bid-ask spreads of the CDS prices. As for the functional form, we
simply run regressions on multiple functional forms of bid-ask spreads and
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report the one with the highest R2 result. It turns out that the log scale
results in the highest R2 for the regression.
In theory we should include fixed effects in all regressions. However, as
we have seen from Table 3.5, including firm fixed effect will naturally dry
out the industry characteristics effect. Also, including month fixed effect will
naturally dry out the industry distress effect. Thus, in this section, we first
run a regression without fixed effects in one table and then run a regression
with fixed effects in the next table.
Table 3.6 shows the result of the regression with control variables but
without fixed effects. The first column shows the original regression as in
Table 3.4. The second column shows the regression with additional S&P500
index returns as a control for the state of the economy. The third column
shows the regression with additional industry returns as a control for the state
of the industry. The fourth column shows the regression with log(Bid-Ask
spreads) as a control for illiquidity. The fifth column shows the regression
with all the control variables.
When we add index returns as a control in the second column, all the
regression coefficients are the same except for Distress, whose coefficient
decreases from 0.40 to 0.31 but is still significant. The coefficient for index
returns itself is also highly significant with a negative sign as expected. This
means that the state of the economy can influence the CDS spreads in ad-
dition to the factors in the original regression. More interestingly, the state
of the economy can affect the recovery factor that used to be captured by
the industry distress factor. However, since Distress is still significant, we
see that industry distress still determines the recovery rates after controlling
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for the economy. The lag(Distress) factor remains highly significant with
high magnitude. Perhaps lag(Distress) is even a better proxy for industry
distress, because the CDS market may take some time to incorporate this
information into the price. We will see this phenomenon more in the later
regressions.
When we add industry returns as a control in the third column, all the
regression coefficients are the same except for Distress, whose coefficient
decreases from 0.40 to 0.28 but is still highly significant. The coefficient
for industry returns itself is also highly significant with a negative sign as
expected. Similar to index returns, industry returns can affect the recovery
factor that used to be captured by the industry distress factor, even more so
than index returns. However, since Distress is still significant, the industry
distress factor still determines the recovery rates after controlling for the
state of the industry.
When we add illiquidity as a control in the fourth column, most of the
previous coefficients including the I1 − I9 industry characteristics variables
remain significant except for I2. The coefficients also change from the original
regression. The coefficient for illiquidity itself is highly significant with a
positive sign as expected. Thus, illiquidity does affect the CDS spreads
that used to be captured by the industry characteristics. The more drastic
effect is on the Distress and lag(Distress) factors. After controlling for
illiquidity, the coefficients for Distress and lag(Distress) decrease from 0.40
to 0.20 and 0.39 to 0.19, respectively. This means that during the period of
illiquid market, CDS spreads are higher because it is hard to find a seller.
Moreover, the market is usually illiquid when the industry is also in distress,
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which is also when the recovery rates are expected to be lower. The effect of
recovery rates in distress, and also the effect of illiquidity on CDS spreads,
were captured by the Distress and lag(Distress) factors in the original
regression. However, when we include illiquidity factor as a control variable
in this regression, we separate the effects of industry distress and illiquidity.
As a result, we see the coefficients for Distress and lag(Distress) decrease
significantly. However, since both factors are still highly significant, the
industry distress factor still determines the recovery rates after controlling
for illiquidity.
Finally we include all control variables in the fifth column. The coef-
ficients of I1-I9 are very similar to the fourth column. The coefficient for
lag(Distress) stays the same as in the fourth column, but the coefficient for
Distress decreases from 0.20 to 0.13 and becomes insignificant at 10% level.
This means that the illiquidity factor affects CDS spreads in a similar way
as industry characteristics and industry distress, more so than index returns
and industry returns. The coefficient of Distress decreases from the fourth
column because Distress is also affected by index returns and industry re-
turns, as shown in the second and third column.
The magnitude of Distress and lag(Distress) in the last column is more
realistic. The magnitude of 0.13 and 0.19 in the log scale translates to e0.13−1
= 0.14 and e0.19−1 = 0.21, or 14% and 21% decrease in risk-neutral recovery
rates. This magnitude is also consistent with the result from our theoretical
section. We also see thatDistress itself is not significant but lag(Distress) is
still significant. This can mean that the information about industry distress
takes some time to be realized in the market price because the CDS market
87
is not perfectly liquid.
In sum, after controlling for all other factors that may affect CDS spreads,
the industry characteristics and industry distress factors are still highly sig-
nificant. In particular, the significance of the industry distress indicator
confirms that the stochastic recovery rates are priced into CDS spreads, ex
ante.
Now we add in the firm and time fixed effects in the regression. The
result is reported in Table 3.7.
The first column of Table 3.7 shows the regression with no fixed effect,
the same as in the last column of Table 3.6. The second column shows the
regression with only firm fixed effect. The third and fourth columns show the
regression with firm-year and firm-month fixed effect. Note that we again see
a jump in R2 from the first column to the next three columns. Fixed effects
indeed play a significant role in explaining CDS spreads. The R2 is almost
90%. This is quite interesting. As complicated as CDS cash flows are, only
a handful of factors can explain almost 90% of all the spreads.
In the second column we see the same effect as before. After control-
ling for firm fixed effect, some of the industry characteristics lose statistical
significance. However, lag(Distress) is still highly significant with roughly
the same magnitude while Distress becomes significant at 10% level. The
result in the third column is similar to the second column. In the fourth
column, after controlling for the time fixed effect at monthly level, we see
the magnitude of Distress and lag(Distress) decreases substantially. How-
ever, both coefficients are still highly significant. Note that the magnitude
of Distress and lag(Distress) in the first three columns stays roughly at
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0.2 which translates into about 20% decrease in risk-neutral recovery rates
in distress. In the last column the magnitude decreases to 0.09 or 9% in
linear scale. This can also mean that the month fixed effect absorbs too
much information from the industry condition. Controlling for such fine in-
formation will naturally, or perhaps too severely, dry out the significance
and magnitude of other variables. After all, putting in too many time fixed
effects will drive away the effect of any time-varying variable which we want
to investigate. Nevertheless, the coefficients are still significant and our main
hypothesis still goes through.
3.6.1 Time-Varying Risk Premium
It has been shown that risk premium is also time-varying, higher in reces-
sions and lower in booms. The risk premium is the difference of stochastic
quantities in the physical and risk-neutral measure. In this case, our concern
is that the risk premium changes the risk-neutral default probabilities even
if the firm has the same distance-to-default. It is possible that the industry
distress factor is just a proxy for bad times and its significance may just mean
that in bad times the risk-neutral default probability is higher, but recovery
rates are unchanged. With this concern, we try to control for time-varying
risk premium in this section.
Before and During the Crisis
Risk premium should increase during the crisis, so as industry distress. Thus,
industry distress may just be a proxy for an increase in risk-neutral default
probabilities, and not stochastic recovery rates. In this subsection we split the
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data into before and during the crisis period. The before-crisis period is from
2004-2006 and the during-crisis period is from 2007 to mid 2008. This way,
industry distress condition is not just a proxy for a change in risk premium.
We run the same regression as in Table 3.7 with firm and year fixed effects.
We drop firms with the market cap more than 5% of the market (28 firms
out of 332). These firms may have too strong effects on the industry distress
dummy variable. In the previous regressions we also tried dropping these
firms and the results did not change. The result is reported in Table 3.8. We
only report the coefficients for default probabilities and recovery rates, i.e.,
Distress, lag(Distress), log(PD), and log(PD from Ratings). We are not
concerned with the significance of industry dummy or other control variables
here.
Even after splitting the data into two subperiods, the coefficient for
lag(Distress) is still significant for both subperiods. Interestingly, before
the crisis, only the lag(Distress) is significant, and during the crisis, both
Distress and its lag are significant with higher magnitude. This gives us
an opportunity to learn about behavioral credit market. During the boom,
information about industry distress takes time to get incorporated into the
price. During the crisis, investors pay particular attention to bad news, and
thus industry distress information gets incorporated into prices very quickly.
Time-varying Risk-Neutral Probability of Default
Now we tackle the problem of time-varying risk-neutral probability of default
in another way. We assume that risk premium can change over time and thus
the risk-neutral probability of default can change even if the firm has the
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same characteristics in the physical measure. We include the interaction term
between log(PD) and Y ear (logPD ∗ Y ear2005, for example) and log(PD
from Ratings) and Y ear in the regression. The idea is that there is an average
effect of probability of default on CDS spreads. However, as time changes,
the risk-neutral probability of default changes and this will reflect in the
interaction term. The result is reported in Table 3.9. We do not report the
coefficients for control variables.
As we can see from Table 3.9, lag(Distress) is still highly significant
after controlling for time-varying probability of default. Distress has the
right sign and reasonable magnitude but is not significant, which, again,
may reflect how information is incorporated into the price is the CDS market.
This result again confirms our hypothesis that risk-neutral recovery rates are
indeed linked to the industry distress condition.
3.6.2 Using Implied Volatility
In the previous regressions we calculate the asset volatility using historical
equity volatility as an input. This method may raise some concerns about
the forward-looking nature of CDS spreads. Using historical volatility to
calculate the probability of default may not be accurate since the probability
of default needs to be forward-looking. This is not a problem if the volatility
is a constant but empirical evidence seems to suggest otherwise. In particular,
the significance ofDistress and lag(Distress) may be a proxy for the changes
in forward-looking volatilities, which, in turn, increase the probability of
default. In this section we use option implied volatilities as an input instead
of historical equity volatility. Implied volatilities are forward-looking and
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should eliminate the concern.
We use implied volatility surface from OptionMetrics. We use 1-year
at-the-money call option with delta = 50. We then run the exact same
regression as in Table 3.7 and report the result in Table 3.10. We report
only the coefficients related to industry distress and probability of default,
i.e., Distress, lag(Distress), log(PD from Implied Volatility) and log(PD
from ratings). We conclude that our main results still go through using
forward-looking implied volatility instead of historical equity volatility.
3.6.3 Lag Effect
In the previous regressions, it turns out that Distress and lag(Distress) are
highly significant. In some instances, however, Distress is not significant
but lag(Distress) is significant instead. It is understandable that Distress
should be significant because the recovery rates are expected to be lower
during the industry distress period. However, why is lag(Distress) also
significant, and even more persistent than Distress? Why does Distress
still affect CDS spreads even after a month? In this section we provide a
couple of possible explanations:
1. CDS market is illiquid:
It is generally believed that the CDS market is more liquid than the
bonds market. However, as we have also touched upon in this paper, the
CDS market is not ”perfectly” liquid. We have shown that illiquidity
factor (bid-ask spreads) can affect the CDS spreads. If the market is
not liquid, then it can take time for new information to be incorporated
into the price of CDS. For example, when the industry is in distress,
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the recovery rates are expected to be lower, thus CDS spreads higher.
However, it may be hard to find a seller in such situation and for a buyer
to agree to pay a higher price. The information of industry distress may
not show in the CDS prices until some later time. Thus, it is possible
that lag(Distress) is significant in explaining the CDS spreads.
2. Price discovery occurs in the equity market and not in the CDS mar-
ket:
We use industry returns information from the equity market to de-
fine industry distress. However, as has been shown in Hilscher et al.
(2010), equity returns lead credit protection returns, while credit pro-
tection returns do not lead equity returns. The authors interpret their
findings as evidence that informed traders are primarily active in the
equity market. They state that the participants in CDS markets do not
pay sufficient attention to equity returns. If equity returns lead CDS
returns, then using the information in equity returns to explain CDS
spreads will exhibit some lag effect. In the case of industry distress
which is related to default, CDS market participants may pay atten-
tion to such event and thus the information is incorporated into CDS
spreads as shown by the Distress variable. However, market partici-
pants may not pay sufficient attention to equity returns and thus some
information about industry distress is slow to be incorporated into CDS
spreads, as shown by the lag(Distress) variable.
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3.7 Modified Theoretical Model
In this section we modify the credit derivatives pricing model to incorpo-
rate the empirical results in the previous sections. In the last paragraph of
Acharya et al. (2007), the authors suggest future researchers to derive a
general equilibrium model which analyzes the risk premium arising from the
industry distress effect. However, in this paper we are only concerned with
the pricing model with no-arbitrage assumption. Our first concern is that
the stochastic recovery rates may not even be incorporated into the empiri-
cal prices ex ante. If that is the case, then it would be of no use to modify
the theoretical model to incorporate stochastic recovery rates. In the previ-
ous section, we have already established that ex ante (risk-neutral) recovery
rates exhibit the same characteristics as the ex post (physical) recovery rates.
The remaining task is to incorporate these results into the theoretical model.
The model links the unobserved risk-neutral recovery rates to the observable
industry index.
We start with the CDS pricing equation in (3.2). The important quantity
in this equation is q(u). In a structural model we characterize default as the
first passage time of the firm value (V ) across the barrier (B). We assume the
barrier grows at the same rate as the expected growth rate of the firm, i.e.,
the firm has a constant expected leverage ratio in the risk-neutral measure.
This assumption turns out to simplify much of the mathematics involved.
Economically, this assumption is supported by recent papers; Almeida and
Philippon (2007) argues that firms evaluate capital structure decisions in
the risk-neutral measure; Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) finds that
a structural model with mean-reverting leverage ratios is more consistent
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with empirical findings. Considering the two papers together, we assume
in the model that firms maintain a constant expected leverage ratio in the
risk-neutral measure. The probability of default is equal to the first passage
time distribution. The analytical formula is well-known as given by Harrison
(1985) and Shreve (2004) and is also used by Zhou (2001). We give a basic
setup and the result here while the proof can be found in Appendix A.
In the risk-neutral measure, we have
dV
V
= rdu+ σdWQ
Let B(u) be the default barrier at time u. By our assumption,
B(u) = B(0)e(r−
σ2
2
)u
With this setup, we get the default density (or first passage time density) in
the risk-neutral measure:
q(m,u) =
m
u
√
2piu
e
−m2
2u
where m =
log(
V (0)
B(0)
)
σ
. Note that m is equivalent to the distance-to-default at
the beginning of the CDS contract. The density q(m,u) here is indeed what
we want for q(u) in equation 3.2.
Proof : See Appendix A.1
Figure 1.1 shows the probability density of default, q(m,u), for selected
values of m corresponding to different credit ratings. Figure 1.2 shows the
historical default density from S&P report for firms with different credit
ratings. Note that the two figures show similar patterns of default for different
rated firms. We can conclude that the theoretical formula of default density,
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q(m,u), can capture real-world default probabilities, and thus can be used
to calculate CDS spreads.
3.7.1 The Recovery Model
Empirical findings suggest that recovery rates depend on the industry con-
dition; if the industry is in distress when the firm defaults, then the recovery
rates will be lower than in the normal time. This result also has support from
theoretical papers such as Shleifer and Vishny (1992). The empirical results
from Acharya et al. (2007) and Altman et al. (2005) confirm the theory ex
post (after the default occurs) and in the physical measure. Our empirical
results from CDS data confirm that the ex post expectation is also incorpo-
rated into the credit derivatives prices ex ante, in the risk-neutral measure.
In this section we suggest a theoretical model for the recovery factor that
can be used to price credit derivatives.
The key quantity is the expected risk-neutral recovery rate given default.
Let R(t) be the risk-neutral recovery rate at time t. Then
R(t) = a1 − a21{Distress(t)|Default(t)} (3.14)
This indicates that the risk-neutral recovery rate during normal time is a1
while the risk-neutral recovery rate during the distressed period is lower by
a2. The value of a1 and a2 can also vary from industry to industry.
In the pricing model, investors take expectation of recovery rates to price
credit derivatives. Note that this expectation is taken in the risk-neutral
measure, so the probability and magnitude may not be the same as in the
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physical measure.
EQ[R(t)|Default(t)] = a1 − a2P {Distress(t)|Default(t)} (3.15)
The result in (3.15) is a straightforward expectation from (3.14), where we
note that the expectation of an indicator function is the probability of the
event. The key quantity in the recovery factor in CDS is then P {Distress(t)|Default(t)}
A Simple Model
To calculate P {Distress(t)|Default(t)}, we identify the dynamics of the
firm’s value, firm’s barrier, industry index and industry barrier as follows:
dV
V
= rdt+ σV dW
Q (3.16)
B(t) = B(0)e(r−
σ2V
2
)t (3.17)
dI
I
= rdt+ σIdZ
Q (3.18)
D(t) = D(0) (3.19)
corr(dZ, dW ) = ρ (3.20)
The first two equations for the firm’s dynamics are similar to the setup in
the previous section when we calculate the probability of default. The third
equation is the industry index dynamics. We assume that industry index
grows similarly to the firm in the risk-neutral measure. The fourth equation is
the industry barrier dynamics which we assume to be a constant. If industry
index, I(t), falls below the industry barrier, D(t), then we say that the
industry is in distress at time t. Finally, we assign ρ to be the correlation
between the firm’s dynamics and the industry dynamics.
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Given the dynamics of the firm and the industry, we can find the proba-
bility that the industry is in distress when the firm defaults as
P {Distress(t)|Default(t)} =

N
(
log(D(0)/I(0))−(r−σ2I/2)t√
t(1−ρ)σI
+
√
ρm√
t(1−ρ)
)
if ρ ≥ 0
N
(
log(D(0)/I(0))−(r−σ2I/2)t√
t(1−|ρ|)σI
−
√
|ρ|m√
t(1−|ρ|)
)
if ρ < 0
Proof : See Appendix A.5
For shorthand, we call the above function p, i.e,
P {Distress(t)|Default(t)} = p(m(0), D(0), I(0), ρ, t) (3.21)
The function p(m(0), D(0), I(0), ρ, t) requires input m(0), D(0), I(0) and
ρ which are known when pricing the CDS. The probability is characterized by
these four numbers and the time of interest (t). The distance-to-default (m)
is calculated from the DDBS in the previous section. The industry index (I)
can be observed and the correlation (ρ) can be estimated. The only quantity
that we have not specified is D(0) or the industry distress barrier at time 0.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no standard way to define industry
distress. We propose the following definition for industry distress which we
will use to price CDS.
D(0) = c
1
5
0∫
−5
I(u)du
 , where c = 0.8 (3.22)
The intuition behind this barrier is that industry distress should depend
on the average level of industry index. We then use the 5-year average of
industry index as a benchmark. Distress then should mean that the industry
index falls below a fraction of the past industry index. In this case we use a
98
constant c = 0.8. The value of c need not be fixed at 0.8. However, according
to practitioners’ views (Wall Street News, Yahoo Finance, etc.), the fall of
stock by more than 20% signifies distress. Since most investors also listen to
practitioners’ views, we take c = 0.8 as the cutoff level.
Having defined industry distress barrier and the probability of distress
given default, we are ready to price CDS. Before we do so, there is an issue
about time-consistency of the model. In this simple model, we let D(0) be
the industry barrier, which is known at time 0. An investor will take D(0)
and use it to price CDS from year 0 to 5, forgetting all the past histories
of the industry index. This assumption may be unrealistic. For example,
the probability of distress looking from year 1 to year 5 may depend on
the history of industry index from year -4 to year 0, and the dynamics of
industry index from year 0 to year 1 which is still unknown at year 0. This is
different from taking D(0) as a constant and the calculate the probability of
distress from year 1 to year 5. With this concern, we also propose a different
time-consistent model.
Time-Consistent Model
We modify the industry barrier dynamics to be a rolling average of the pre-
vious 5-year industry index. We first define the quantity
h(t) =
1
5
t∫
t−5
log(I(u))du (3.23)
This is the average of industry index (in log scale) over the period of 5 years.
We will specify industry distress as when
log(I(t)) < b ∗ h(t) (3.24)
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and b will be left to be determined later in the empirical section.
We focus first on the quantity h(t). With this specification, h(t) may de-
pends on both the past information and the future randomness. For example
h(0) =
1
5
0∫
−5
log(I(u))du
This will depend only on the past information. In other words, the probabil-
ity of distress at time 0 is known by just comparing log(I(0)) with b ∗ h(0)
As the time moves forward, h(t) will have randomness due to the ran-
domness of the industry dynamics. For example
h(1) =
1
5
1∫
−4
log(I(u))du =
1
5
0∫
−4
log(I(u))du+
1
5
1∫
0
log(I(u))du
The first quantity on the right side is known at time 0 and there is no
randomness there. The second quantity will depend on the dynamics of I(t)
and is the source of randomness. We will call the first quantity k(t) where
k(t) =
1
5
0∫
t−5
log(I(u))du (3.25)
Thus, we can write (3.23) as
h(t) = k(t) +
1
5
t∫
0
log(I(u))du (3.26)
With the setup in (3.24) and (3.26), we can derive the probability of
industry distress given the firm’s default as follows:
P {Distress(t)|Default(t)} = N
 µ(t)√
t(1− |ρ|) + b2t3
75
 (3.27)
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where
µ(t) =

bk(t)+( bt
5
−1)log(I(0))+( bt2
10
−t)(r−σ
2
I
2
)
σI
+
√
ρm if ρ ≥ 0
bk(t)+( bt
5
−1)log(I(0))+( bt2
10
−t)(r−σ
2
I
2
)
σI
−√|ρ|m if ρ < 0
Proof : See Appendix A.6
For shorthand, we call the above function p, i.e,
P {Distress(t)|Default(t)} = p(m(0), k(t), I(0), ρ, t) (3.28)
Note that we still need to determine the value of b for empirical tests. Ob-
viously b must be less than 1, but the precise value of b will be determined
later in the empirical section.
3.7.2 CDS Pricing with Stochastic Recovery Model
We have derived the expected recovery rates in the previous section. In this
section we incorporate the result into the CDS pricing model.
Similar to the model in (3.2) by Hull et al. (2009), we let the recovery
rate (R) be stochastic and get the model for CDS spreads as
S =
T∫
0
(1− EQ[R(t)|Default(t)])q(u)v(u)du
T∫
0
q(u)[h(u) + e(u)]du+ (1−
T∫
0
q(u)du)h(T ))
(3.29)
We specify EQ[R(t)|Default(t)] in (3.15) and then P {Distress(t)|Default(t)}
in (3.21) and (3.28). Plugging in the results from the derivation, we get the
following
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1. The simple model:
S =
T∫
0
(1− a1 + a2p(m(0), D(0), I(0), ρ, u))q(u)v(u)du
T∫
0
q(u)[h(u) + e(u)]du+ (1−
T∫
0
q(u)du)h(T ))
= (1− a1)

T∫
0
q(u)v(u)du
T∫
0
q(u)[h(u) + e(u)]du+ (1−
T∫
0
q(u)du)h(T ))

+a2

T∫
0
p(m(0), D(0), I(0), ρ, u)q(u)v(u)du
T∫
0
q(u)[h(u) + e(u)]du+ (1−
T∫
0
q(u)du)h(T ))
 (3.30)
2. The time-consistent model:
S =
T∫
0
(1− a1 + a2p(m(0), k(u), I(0), ρ, u))q(u)v(u)du
T∫
0
q(u)[h(u) + e(u)]du+ (1−
T∫
0
q(u)du)h(T ))
= (1− a1)

T∫
0
q(u)v(u)du
T∫
0
q(u)[h(u) + e(u)]du+ (1−
T∫
0
q(u)du)h(T ))

+a2

T∫
0
p(m(0), k(u), I(0), ρ, u)q(u)v(u)du
T∫
0
q(u)[h(u) + e(u)]du+ (1−
T∫
0
q(u)du)h(T ))
 (3.31)
The equations (3.30) and (3.31) are similar except for the probability of
distress given default on the RHS. The coefficient of interest here is a2 which
indicates how much the recovery rates fall if the firm defaults during the
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period of industry distress. With our model specification, all parameters
after the integral sign are observable. The only unknowns are a1 and a2,
with particular attention to a2. We proceed to estimate a2 in the empirical
section.
3.7.3 Empirical Analysis
We use the same CDS data as in the previous empirical part. The value of m
is calculated from the DDBS explained before. The only extra data required
for this part are the industry index and the correlation between the industry
index and the firm’s value. For industry index, we use the data from Kenneth
French’s website1. We use the monthly data for 10 industry portfolios. For
each industry, we start with 100 as the industry index in 1994. Then we
calculate the next industry index from the historical monthly returns. This
way, we have historical industry index for 10 years before 2004, which is the
beginning period of our CDS data. Note that we do not require the absolute
size of the industry. We only need the relative size of the industry for each
period so we can determine whether the industry is in distress with respect
to its own past relative size.
To calculate the correlation between the industry index and the firm’s
value, we use the data from the same source. For industry returns, we use
the data from Kenneth French’s website for 10 industry portfolios. For firm’s
returns, we use the data from the CRSP database. We use 1-year past
correlation of returns as an input to the model.
From (3.30) and (3.31), we can find the value after the integral sign by
1http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
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numerical integration. Since the model is exact, in the empirical analysis we
write the model as
S = (1− a1)X1 + a2X2 +  (3.32)
where X1 is the first bracket and X2 is the second bracket of the RHS of
(3.30) and (3.31), and  is white noise. With this specification, we can
simply estimate a2 by an OLS regression. We select the industry distress
ratio c = 0.8 for the simple model and b = 0.94 for the time-consistent
model. The choice of c = 0.8 has been explained in the previous section.
The choice of b = 0.94 is to be consistent with c = 0.8 in the linear scale.
The regression result is shown in Table 3.11
The results show that the coefficient a2 is highly significant. This means
that the expected risk-neutral recovery rates are lower during the industry
distress period. Obviously the magnitude of a2 depends heavily on the dis-
tress barrier, i.e., the chosen value of c and b. If we choose c = 0.8 and
b = 0.94, then the recovery rates are lower by about 20% if the firm defaults
during the period of industry distress. Since in the regression we do not sep-
arate by industry, this number is an average of all industries. Note that this
value is the expected decrease of recovery rates in the risk-neutral measure.
It may not correspond exactly to the realized decrease of recovery rates in
the physical measure, but we can still learn useful information about the
variation of recovery rates across business cycles. Overall we conclude that
our theoretical model complies with the data with reasonable parameters.
The risk-neutral recovery rates are indeed stochastic and can be captured by
this simple model.
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3.8 Conclusion and Future Work
The recovery rates have long been treated as a constant in both academic
and practitioner community. The literature on credit derivative pricing has
focused mostly on estimating the probability of default. Recently it has been
found that the realized recovery rates are stochastic and highly correlated
with the industry condition when the firm defaults. We found that the mar-
ket has already incorporated stochastic recovery rates into credit derivative
pricing ex ante, in the risk-neutral measure. We derive a model to capture
this finding which can be used to learn about stochastic recovery rates across
business cycles.
Although it is hard to separate the effect of the risk-neutral probabil-
ity of default and risk-neutral recovery rates, we have identified the effect
of the risk-neutral recovery factor on CDS spreads. The market adjusts for
the recovery rates ex ante to price credit derivatives. The ex ante recovery
rates are consistent with the realized recovery rates found in the literature.
In particular, recovery rates depend on industry characteristics and indus-
try distress, both ex ante (in the risk-neutral measure) and ex post (in the
physical measure).
There can be a few other explanations but we can rule them out. The first
is that risk premium is time-varying and thus we may have not controlled
for the risk-neutral default probabilities properly. In the robustness check
section we address this concern and show that even if we let the default
probabilities vary with time, the main result still goes through. The second is
that illiquidity may be the true cause of industry characteristics and industry
distress factors. We have included illiquidity in the robustness check and the
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result still holds. The next question is the significance of the lag of industry
distress factor. A possible explanation may be that the credit market is
illiquid, so new information takes time to be incorporated into the price. The
other explanation may be that price discovery occurs in the equity market
long before the credit market. Thus using the industry distress information
from the equity market to explain CDS spreads naturally exhibits the lag
effect.
We propose a simple theoretical model to capture the stochastic recovery
rates. The model links the unobserved risk-neutral recovery rates to the
observable industry index. The expected risk-neutral recovery rate will be
lower if the industry is in distress when the firm defaults. The model is a
structural model with the first passage time as a default - the firm defaults
the first time that its value crosses the debt barrier. The industry index also
follows a structural model - the industry is in distress if the industry index is
below the industry barrier. With a reasonable set of parameters, the model is
consistent with the data and the expected risk-neutral recovery rate is lower
by about 20% if the firm defaults when the industry is in distress. However,
it is the structure of the model that we emphasize here, not the number 20%.
We can use this model to learn about stochastic recovery rates in different
periods and may get different numbers from 20%.
The stochastic recovery rates are indeed priced in the CDS spreads. Our
theoretical model captures the empirical findings and can be used to price
credit derivatives. We can also use the model to extract expected recovery
rates across business cycles and use this information for risk management.
The next issue may be to use this stochastic recovery model to price Collat-
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eralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and study the effect of stochastic recovery
rates on the implied correlation smile.
3.9 Figures and Tables
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of CDS data
The table shows the summary statistics of CDS data used in the empirical
section. CDS Spread shows the spreads in basis points. The remaining
information in the table comes from the CRSP database. Market Cap shows
the market capitalization of firms in millions. Stock Monthly Volatility
shows monthly volatility of the stock. Beta(β) shows the beta coefficient
when regressing the stock returns with market returns. SMB and HML
shows the regression coefficients when regressing the stock returns with the
SMB and HML factors
CDS Spread Market Cap (M) Stock Monthly Volatility β SMB HML
mean 79.27 27,496 0.068 0.94 0.12 0.31
median 38.60 13,524 0.062 0.85 0 0.19
min 1.5 176 0.031 -0.19 -3.05 -1.34
5% quantile 11.7 1,923 0.036 0.16 -0.87 -0.81
25% quantile 23.7 6,404 0.049 0.63 -0.33 -0.19
50% quantile 38.6 13,524 0.062 0.85 0 0.19
75% quantile 70.5 27,955 0.078 1.18 0.60 0.76
95% quantile 316.1 99,429 0.120 2.09 1.41 1.67
max 2666.5 513,362 0.229 2.77 2.44 2.79
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Table 3.2: Industry Classification
This table shows the percentage of firms in the data set classified into each
industry, according to the Siccodes on Kenneth French’s website.
Number Industry Percent
1 Consumer Nondurables 7.75
2 Consumer Durables 2.87
3 Manufacturing 17.65
4 Energy 5.41
5 Hi-tech 5.69
6 Telecom 3.10
7 Wholesale, Retail 12.48
8 Healthcare 7.20
9 Utilities 8.76
10 Other: Mines, Trans,Const, Finance, etc 29.10
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Table 3.3: Distress cutoff returns for each industry
The table shows the monthly returns below which the industry is in distress.
The cutoff level is the 10th percentile of historical monthly industry returns
from 1994 to 2003. The industry returns data are from Kenneth French’s
website.
Number Fama-French Industry Distress Cutoff
1 Consumer Nondurables -4.1%
2 Consumer Durables -6.7%
3 Manufacturing -4.6%
4 Energy -4.8%
5 Hi-tech -11.8%
6 Telecom -8.4%
7 Wholesale, Retail -5.0%
8 Healthcare -5.8%
9 Utilities -5.3%
10 Other: Mines, Trans,Const, Finance, etc -5.0%
110
Table 3.4: OLS regression for recovery rates effect in CDS
The dependent variable is log(CDS spreads). I1− I9 are industry
dummy variables for industry 1 to 9. Distress and lag(Distress) are
dummy variables for industry distress condition as defined in Table
3.3. PD and PD from ratings are probability of default calculated
from the PDBS and S&P Ratings. Interest rates of Treasury bills
for 3 months and 5 years are also included as control variables.
Standard errors are adjusted for 10 clusters in industry and shown
in parentheses. (***significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5%
level, * significant at 10% level)
Explanatory Variables With Industry Condition Without Industry Condition
Intercept 5.33∗∗∗
(0.17)
Distress 0.40∗∗
(0.15)
lag(Distress) 0.39∗∗∗
(0.11)
I1 (Consumer Nondurables) −0.17∗∗∗
(0.014)
I2 (Consumer Durables) 0.14∗∗∗
(0.017)
I3 (Manufacturing) −0.17∗∗∗
(0.014)
I4 (Energy) −0.30∗∗∗
(0.008)
Continued on next page
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Explanatory Variables With Industry Condition Without Industry Condition
I5 (Hi-tech) −0.11∗∗∗
(0.032)
I6 (Telecom) 0.35∗∗∗
(0.039)
I7 (Wholesale, Retail) −0.15∗∗∗
(0.011)
I8 (Healthcare) 0.04
(0.04)
I9 (Utilities) −0.22∗∗∗
(0.024)
log(PD) 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003)
log(PD from Ratings) 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033)
3-month Int. Rates 0.02 0.056
(0.02) (0.043)
5-year Int. Rates −0.35∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.11)
Obs 13477 13477
R2 0.6386 0.6047
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Table 3.5: OLS regression for recovery rates effect in CDS
with firm and time fixed effects
The dependent variable is log(CDS spreads). I1− I9 are industry
dummy variables for industry 1 to 9. Distress and lag(Distress) are
dummy variables for industry distress condition as defined in Table
3.3. PD and PD from ratings are probability of default calculated
from the PDBS and S&P Ratings. Interest rates of Treasury bills
for 3 months and 5 years are also included as control variables.
Standard errors are adjusted for 10 clusters in industry and shown
in parentheses. (***significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5%
level, * significant at 10% level)
Fixed Effect None Firm and Year Firm and Month
Intercept 5.33∗∗∗ 3.94∗∗∗ 5.40∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.086) (0.26)
Distress 0.40∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.15) (0.12) (0.06)
lag(Distress) 0.39∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.11) (0.07) (0.07)
I1 −0.17∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.12) (0.13)
I2 0.14∗∗∗ −0.008 0.04
(0.017) (0.16) (0.17)
I3 −0.17∗∗∗ −0.11∗ −0.09∗
(0.014) (0.05) (0.04)
I4 −0.30∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗ −0.48∗∗
Continued on next page
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Fixed Effect None Firm and Year Firm and Month
(0.008) (0.18) (0.20)
I5 −0.11∗∗∗ 0.16 0.13
(0.032) (0.13) (0.15)
I6 0.35∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(0.039) (0.11) (0.12)
I7 −0.15∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.07) (0.07)
I8 0.04 0.29∗∗ 0.26∗∗
(0.04) (0.10) (0.11)
I9 −0.22∗∗∗ −0.10 −0.08
(0.024) (0.10) (0.10)
log(PD) 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.00013) (0.00012)
log(PD from Ratings) 0.43∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.065) (0.068)
3-month Int. Rates 0.02 −0.18∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
5-year Int. Rates −0.35∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.62∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.015) (0.12)
Obs 13477 13477 13477
R2 0.6386 0.8294 0.8466
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Table 3.7: OLS regression for recovery rates effect in
CDS, with control variables, with fixed effects
The independent variables are the same as Table 3.4.
Extra control variables are as follows: Index Returns
are S&P500 index returns. Indtustry Returns are the
monthly returns for each industry. log(Bid-Ask Spreads)
is the log of bid-ask spreads of CDS quotes. Standard
errors are adjusted for 10 clusters in industry and shown
in parentheses. (***significant at 1% level, ** significant
at 5% level, * significant at 10% level)
Fixed Effect
Explanatory Variables None Firm Only Firm and Year Firm and Month
Intercept 3.62∗∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗ 3.00∗∗∗ 4.00∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.18) (0.18) (0.12)
Distress 0.13 0.15∗ 0.14∗ 0.09∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.035)
lag(Distress) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗
(0.05) (0.045) (0.03) (0.037)
I1 −0.14∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
I2 0.015 0.004 0.06 0.09
(0.018) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12)
I3 −0.19∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.03 −0.04
Continued on next page
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Explanatory Variables None Firm Only Firm and Year Firm and Month
(0.011) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
I4 −0.23∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.32∗∗ −0.33∗∗
(0.007) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13)
I5 −0.14∗∗∗ 0.08 0.07 0.04
(0.022) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09)
I6 0.18∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.023) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
I7 −0.08∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗
(0.013) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
I8 −0.099∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗
(0.033) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
I9 −0.23∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.07 −0.05
(0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
log(PD) 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
log(PD from Ratings) 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
3-month Int Rates 0.029 0.03∗ −0.1∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.02) (0.03)
5-year Int Rates −0.21∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.01) (0.044)
Index Returns −1.19∗∗ −1.43∗∗ −1.13∗∗∗ −1.14∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Explanatory Variables None Firm Only Firm and Year Firm and Month
(0.417) (0.5) (0.23) (0.27)
Industry Returns −0.003 −0.004 −0.0017 −0.0017
(0.0035) (0.004) (0.0017) (0.002)
log(Bid-Ask Spreads) 0.68∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Obs 13463 13463 13463 13463
R2 0.7571 0.8579 0.8684 0.8793
121
Table 3.8: OLS regression for recovery rates effect in CDS with control vari-
ables and fixed effects, before and during the crisis
The independent variables are the same as in Table 3.6. Before-Crisis is the
period 2004-2006. During-Crisis is the period 2007-2008. We drop firms with
the market cap more than 5% of the industry. Standard errors are adjusted
for 10 clusters in industry and shown in parentheses. (***significant at 1%
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level)
Period
Explanatory Variables Before Crisis During Crisis
Distress 0.001 0.16∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04)
lag(Distress) 0.12∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03)
log(PD) 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002)
log(PD from Ratings) 0.37∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.033)
Obs 8439 3762
R2 0.8816 0.9263
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Table 3.9: OLS regression for recovery rates effect in CDS
with control variables and fixed effects, with time-varying
risk-neutral probability of default
The independent variables are the same as in Table 3.6.
We include the interaction terms between probability of
default and time to control for time-varying risk-neutral
probability of default. Standard errors are adjusted for 10
clusters in industry and shown in parentheses. (***signif-
icant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant
at 10% level)
Interaction Terms
Explanatory Variables Yearly
Distress 0.12
(0.08)
lag(Distress) 0.22∗∗∗
(0.05)
log(PD) 0.0015∗∗
(0.0005)
log(PD)*Year2005 −0.0009∗∗
(0.0004)
log(PD)*Year2006 −0.0009∗∗
(0.0004)
log(PD)*Year2007 −0.0004
Continued on next page
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Explanatory Variables Yearly
(0.0007)
log(PD)*Year2008 0.0006
(0.0010)
log(PD from Ratings) 0.30∗∗∗
(0.05)
log(PD from Ratings)*Yr2005 0.008
(0.02)
log(PD from Ratings)*Yr2006 0.07∗∗∗
(0.02)
log(PD from Ratings)*Yr2007 −0.009
(0.02)
log(PD from Ratings)*Yr2008 −0.15∗∗∗
(0.04)
Obs 13463
R2 0.8728
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Table 3.10: OLS regression for recovery rates effect in CDS with control
variables and fixed effects, using implied volatilities.
The independent variables are the same as Table 3.4. Extra control variables
are as follows: Index Returns are S&P500 index returns. Indtustry Returns
are the monthly returns for each industry. log(Bid-Ask Spreads) is the log of
bid-ask spreads of CDS quotes. Standard errors are adjusted for 10 clusters in
industry and shown in parentheses. (***significant at 1% level, ** significant
at 5% level, * significant at 10% level)
Fixed Effect
Explanatory Variables None Firm Only Firm and Year Firm and Month
Distress 0.11 0.14∗ 0.13 0.10∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.036)
lag(Distress) 0.17∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.038)
log(PD from Implied Volatility) 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004)
log(PD from Ratings) 0.27∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Obs 13309 13309 13309 13309
R2 0.7600 0.8640 0.8715 0.8802
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Table 3.11: OLS regression for the CDS pricing model with stochastic recov-
ery rates - test for the industry distress effect
The independent variables X1 and X2 are defined as in (3.32). The corre-
sponding coefficients are (1 − a1) and a2. The industry distress effect on
recovery rates is shown through the coefficient a2 of the variable X2. The
first column is the simple model as in (3.30). The second column is the time-
consistent model as in (3.31). Standard errors are in parentheses. (***sig-
nificant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level)
Model
Explanatory Variables Simple Time-Consistent
Constant 66.45∗∗∗ 66.41∗∗∗
(0.84) (0.84)
X1 0.14
∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0024)
X2 0.24
∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0105)
Obs 14129 14135
R2 0.32 0.33
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Appendix A
Proofs
A.1 First Passage Time Density
Assume
dV
V
= rdu+ σdWQ
Then
V (u)
V (0)
= e(r−
σ2
2
)u+σW (u)
where W (u) ∼ N(0, u)
Thus,
W (u) =
log(V (u)
V (0)
)− (r − σ2
2
)u
σ
(A.1)
Let B(u) be the default barrier at time u. By our assumption, B(u) =
B(0)e(r−
σ2
2
)u
The default time is min {u : V (u) = B(u)}. Plug B(u) in V (u) in (A.1),
we get the corresponding
W (u) =
log(
B(0)e
(r−σ22 )u
V (0)
)−(r−σ2
2
)u
σ
=
log(
B(0)
V (0)
)
σ
= m˜ (constant)
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Note that min {u : V (u) = B(u)} = min {u : W (u) = m˜}. We can thus
calculate the default density by using the first passage time of W (u) to m˜.
Since Brownian motion is symmetric, the passage time to level m˜ is equivalent
to the passage time to level |m˜|. For convenience, we consider m = |m˜| =
log(
V (0)
B(0)
)
σ
instead.
We define the first passage time to level m:
τm = min {u : X(u) = m}
where m =
log(
V (0)
B(0)
)
σ
and W (0) = 0
Since this is the first passage time of Brownian motion without drift across
a constant barrier m, we use the result from Shreve (2004), theorem 3.7.1.
τm has cumulative distribution function
P {τm ≤ u} = 2Φ(−m√
u
)
and density
q(m,u) =
d
du
P {τm ≤ u} = m
u
√
2piu
e
−m2
2u
A.2 Dynamic of Distance-to-Default
The dynamics of V follows a standard geometric Brownian motion:
dV
V
= rdt+ σdWQ
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Consider m =
log(V
B
)
σ
, thus ∂m
∂V
= 1
σV
, ∂m
∂B
= − 1
σB
and ∂
2m
∂V 2
= − 1
σV 2
. We then
write equation (1.4) as:
dm =
1
σV
(rV dt+ σV dWQ) +
1
2
(− 1
σV 2
)(σV )2dt+ (− 1
σB
)(B(r − σ
2
2
))dt
=
r
σ
dt+ dWQ − σ
2
dt+ (− r
σ
+
σ
2
)dt
= dWQ
Note that the volatiity (σ) and drift (µ) terms all cancel out on the second
line.
A.3 Analytical Approach
The analytical formula for ∂S
∂m
and ∂
2S
∂m2
can be derived as follows. Take S(m)
from (1.2), we can write:
S(m) =
(1− Rˆ)(1 + a∗) ∫ T
0
q(m, r)v(r)dr∫ T
0
q(m, r)[h(r) + e(r)]dr + (1− ∫ T
0
q(m, r)dr)h(T )
=
f(m)
g(m)
(A.2)
Then,
∂S
∂m
=
g ∂f
∂m
− f ∂g
∂m
g2
(A.3)
where
∂f
∂m
= (1− Rˆ)(1 + a∗)
∫ T
0
∂q(m, r)
∂m
v(r)dr
and
∂g
∂m
=
∫ T
0
∂q(m, r)
∂m
[h(r) + e(r)]dr − (
∫ T
0
∂q(m, r)
∂m
dr)h(T )
Now consider q(m, r) = m
r
√
2pir
e
−m2
2r , we get
∂q(m, r)
∂m
=
1
r
√
2pir
e
−m2
2r +
m
r
√
2pir
−m
r
e
−m2
2r =
(
r −m2
r2
√
2pir
)
e
−m2
2r (A.4)
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We plug the value from (A.4) back to ∂f
∂m
and ∂g
∂m
and get
∂f
∂m
= (1− Rˆ)(1 + a∗)
∫ T
0
(
r −m2
r2
√
2pir
)
e
−m2
2r v(r)dr (A.5)
∂g
∂m
=
∫ T
0
(
r −m2
r2
√
2pir
)
e
−m2
2r [h(r) + e(r)]dr − (
∫ T
0
(
r −m2
r2
√
2pir
)
e
−m2
2r dr)h(T )
(A.6)
We then plug (A.5) and (A.6) back into (A.3) and get expression for
∂S
∂m
(m). Note that this only depends on m which only depends on the ratio
V (t)/B(t) at the time of interest. One can also find ∂
2S
∂m2
by applying quotient
rule again to ∂S
∂m
and get
∂2S
∂m2
=
g ∂
2f
∂m2
− f ∂2g
∂m2
− 2 ∂f
∂m
∂g
∂m
g2
+
2f( ∂g
∂m
)2
g3
A.4 First Passage Time Density of Mean-Reverting
Process
This part only replicates the result from Alili et al. (2005). In essence, we
do not prove a new result here, but the transformation of variables is needed
to be able to apply the formula correctly.
The associated Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (Ut)t≥0 with parameter λ is
defined to be the unique solution to the stochastic differential solution
dUt = −λUtdt+ dBt (A.7)
and U0 = x. For a fixed real a, introduce the stopping time
σa = inf {s > 0 : Us = a} (A.8)
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Its law is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. We
set
P(λ)x (σa ∈ dt) = p(λ)x→a(t)dt (A.9)
Theorem. For any x < a, we have the series expansion
p(λ)x→a(t) = −λeλ(x
2−a2)/2
∞∑
j=1
Dj,−a√2λ(−x
√
2λ)
D′
j,−a√2λ(−a
√
2λ)
exp(−λvj,−a√2λt) (A.10)
where Dv(.) is the parabolic cylinder function with index v, and D
′
vj,b
(b) =
∂Dv(b)
∂v
∣∣
v=vj,b .
For v →∞, we have the asymptotic formula
Dv(z) ≈
√
2(v + 1/2)v/2e−(v+1/2)/2 × cos(z
√
v + 1/2− piv/2)(1 +O(v−1/2))
The following large-n asymptotics can be deduced
vn,−a√2λ ≈ 2n− 1 + 4
λa2
pi2
− 2
√
λa
pi
√
4n− 1 + 4λa
2
pi2
and
Dj,−a√2λ(−x
√
2λ)
D′
j,−a√2λ(−a
√
2λ)
≈ (−1)n2
√
2vn,−a√2λ + 1
pi
√
2vn,−a√2λ + 2a
√
pi
×cos(x
√
λ(2vn,−a√2λ + 1)+
pivn,−a√2λ
2
)
The formula above is formulated for the mean-reverting process with the
target 0 and the initial position x. The barrier for the first passage time is
a > x. To fit our process of m to the formula, we need to change the variable
as follows:
U = m− m¯Q
Then
dUt = −λUtdt+ dBt
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as desired. The initial condition is U0 = x = m0 − m¯Q. The barrier is
a = 0− m¯Q = −m¯Q.
With this change of variable, we can then use the close form solution
(A.10) to calculate the first passage time density and compute the CDS
spread accordingly.
A.5 Probability of Distress – Simple Model
From the setup, we can write that
I(t) = I(0)e(r−σ
2
I/2)t+σIZ(t) (A.11)
We define industry distress as I(t) < D(0). From Appendix A, default occurs
when W (t) = −m. Thus
P {Distress(t)|Default(t)} = P {I(t) < D(0)|W (t) = −m}
= P
{
I(0)e(r−σ
2
I/2)t+σIZ(t) < D(0)|W (t) = −m
}
= P{Z(t) < log(D(0)/I(0))− (r − σ
2
I/2)t
σI
|
W (t) = −m} (A.12)
Since corr(dZ, dW ) = ρ, we let
Z(t) =

√
ρW (t) +
√
1− ρX(t) if ρ ≥ 0
−√|ρ|W (t) +√1− |ρ|X(t) if ρ < 0
where X(t) is another Brownian motion independent of Z(t) and W (t).
We then plug the decomposition of Z(t) into (A.12). We demonstrate the
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case where ρ ≥ 0. The case where ρ < 0 will be summarized at the end.
P {Distress(t)|Default(t)} = P
{
√
ρW (t) +
√
1− ρX(t) <
log(D(0)/I(0))− (r − σ2I/2)t
σI
|W (t) = −m
}
= P
{
−√ρm+
√
1− ρX(t) <
log(D(0)/I(0))− (r − σ2I/2)t
σI
}
= P
{
X(t) <
log(D(0)/I(0))− (r − σ2I/2)t√
1− ρσI
+
√
ρm√
1− ρ
}
= P
{
X(t)√
t
<
log(D(0)/I(0))− (r − σ2I/2)t√
t
√
1− ρσI
+
√
ρm√
t
√
1− ρ
}
= N(
log(D(0)/I(0))− (r − σ2I/2)t√
t
√
1− ρσI
+
√
ρm√
t
√
1− ρ) (A.13)
If ρ < 0, then the derivation is similar and the final result is
P {Distress(t)|Default(t)} = N
(
log(D(0)/I(0))− (r − σ2I/2)t√
t
√
1− |ρ|σI
−
√|ρ|m√
t
√
1− |ρ|
)
(A.14)
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A.6 Probability of Distress – Time Consis-
tent Model
First we note that h(t) is a sum of normal random variables, and so is nor-
mally distributed. We need to find the mean and variance of h(t)
E[h(t)] = E[k(t) +
1
5
t∫
0
log(I(u))du]
= k(t) +
1
5
E[
t∫
0
log(I(u))du]
= k(t) +
1
5
t∫
0
E[log(I(u)]du
= k(t) +
1
5
t∫
0
log(I(0)) + (r − σ
2
I
2
)udu
= k(t) +
1
5
(
log(I(0))t+ (r − σ
2
I
2
)
t2
2
)
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V ar[h(t)] = V ar[k(t) +
1
5
t∫
0
log(I(u))du]
=
1
25
V ar[
t∫
0
log(I(u))du]
=
1
25
V ar[
t∫
0
log(I(0)) + (r − σ
2
I
2
)u+ σIZudu]
=
1
25
V ar[
t∫
0
σIZudu]
=
σ2I
25
E
 t∫
0
Zudu
t∫
0
Zsds

=
σ2I
25
E
 t∫
0
t∫
0
ZuZsduds

=
σ2I
25
t∫
0
t∫
0
E[ZuZs]duds
=
σ2I
25
t∫
0
t∫
0
min(u, s)duds
=
2σ2I
25
t∫
0
s∫
0
ududs
=
2σ2I
25
t∫
0
s2
2
ds
=
σ2I
25
t3
3
Having calculated the mean and variance of h(t), we are now ready to
calculate the probability of distress given firm’s default. First we signify h(t)
135
as a normal random variable
h(t) = k(t) +
1
5
(log(I(0))t+ (r − σ
2
I
2
)
t2
2
) +
σI
5
B(t) (A.15)
where
B(t) ∼ N(0, t3/3)
Then
P {Distress(t)|Default(t)} = P {log(I(t)) < bh(t)|W (t) = −m}
= P
{
log(I(0)) + (r − σ
2
I
2
)t+ σIZ(t) < b
(
k(t) +
1
5
(log(I(0))t+ (r − σ
2
I
2
)
t2
2
) +
σI
5
B(t)
)
|W (t) = −m
}
= P
{
Z(t) <
b
(
k(t) + 1
5
(log(I(0))t+ (r − σ2I
2
) t
2
2
)
− log(I(0))− (r − σ2I
2
)t
σI
+
b
5
B(t)
|W (t) = −m
}
Again, we decompose Z(t) into the correlated and uncorrelated parts with
the firm. Since corr(dZ, dW ) = ρ, we let
Z(t) =

√
ρW (t) +
√
1− ρX(t) if ρ ≥ 0
−√|ρ|W (t) +√1− |ρ|X(t) if ρ < 0
where X(t) is another Brownian motion independent of Z(t) and W (t).
We carry on the calculation for the case where ρ ≥ 0. The case where
ρ < 0 is similar and the result will be provided at the end. Substituting the
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decomposition of Z(t) into the previous equation, we get
= P
{
√
ρW (t) +
√
1− ρX(t) <
b
(
k(t) + 1
5
(log(I(0))t+ (r − σ2I
2
) t
2
2
)
σI
−log(I(0))− (r − σ2I
2
)t
σI
+
b
5
B(t)|W (t) = −m
}
= P
{
−√ρm+
√
1− ρX(t) <
b
(
k(t) + 1
5
(log(I(0))t+ (r − σ2I
2
) t
2
2
)
σI
−log(I(0))− (r − σ2I
2
)t
σI
+
b
5
B(t)
}
= P
{√
1− ρX(t) <
(
bk(t) + ( bt
5
− 1)log(I(0)) + ( bt2
10
− t)(r − σ2I
2
)
)
σI
+
√
ρm+
b
5
B(t)
}
= P
{√
1− ρX(t) < µ(t) + b
5
B(t)
}
= P
{√
1− ρX(t)− b
5
B(t) < µ(t)
}
(A.16)
where
µ(t) =
(
bk(t) + ( bt
5
− 1)log(I(0)) + ( bt2
10
− t)(r − σ2I
2
)
)
σI
+
√
ρm
Now we note that the LHS of (A.16) is the difference of two normal random
variables, and thus also normally distributed. We need to find the mean and
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variance of the random variable on the LHS.
E[
√
1− ρX(t)− b
5
B(t)] =
√
1− ρE[X(t)] + b
5
E[B(t)]
= 0
V ar[
√
1− ρX(t)− b
5
B(t)] = V ar[
√
1− ρX(t)] + V ar[ b
5
B(t)]
(X(t) and B(t) are independent)
= t(1− ρ) + b
2
25
t3
3
= t(1− ρ) + b
2t3
75
With this result, we let
η(t) =
√
1− ρX(t)− b
5
B(t)
Then η(t) ∼ N(0, t√1− ρ+ b2t3
75
). Thus, we get
P {Distress(t)|Default(t)} = P {η(t) < µ(t)}
= P
 η(t)√
t(1− ρ) + b2t3
75
<
µ(t)√
t(1− ρ) + b2t3
75

= N
 µ(t)√
t(1− ρ) + b2t3
75
 (A.17)
If ρ < 0, then the derivation is similar and the final result is
µ(t) =
(
bk(t) + ( bt
5
− 1)log(I(0)) + ( bt2
10
− t)(r − σ2I
2
)
)
σI
−
√
|ρ|m
and
P {Distress(t)|Default(t)} = N
 µ(t)√
t(1− |ρ|) + b2t3
75
 (A.18)
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